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Copyright Versus the Right to Copy:
The Civic Danger of Allowing Intellectual Property
Law to Override State Freedom of Information Law
Frank D. LoMonte*
Journalists, researchers, and activists rely on freedom-of-information
laws for access to the essential data and documents they need. But the
ability to copy and republish public documents exists in the chilling
shadow of copyright law. This Article looks at the growing tension
between two bodies of law—federal copyright law and state publicrecords law—and how the aggressive use of copyright law to “paywall”
inspecting and redistributing government documents can inhibit effective
public oversight. The Article identifies the knotty jurisdictional problems
that arise when a dispute over government records requires interpreting
both copyright law (the exclusive province of federal courts) and state
freedom-of-information law (the exclusive province of state courts), with
the practical result that the delay and expense of parallel litigation will
be tantamount to denial of access for all but the most stubborn requester.
Because the public needs government data and documents to discharge
its civic watchdog role, the Article concludes that copyright should not
be understood to impede inspecting and copying public records, because
narrower exemptions for “trade secrets” fully protect rights-holders’
legitimate economic interests.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom-of-information (FOI) law facilitates duplicating and
distributing other people’s work. Copyright law restricts duplicating and
distributing other people’s work. Plainly, these two bodies of law coexist
uneasily. What is to be done when they collide?
On occasion, they have. Take the case of an inquisitive citizen who
wants to see a copy of the syllabus for a course taught at a public
university. Under state public-records statutes, producing the document
is an easy call; the state agency has it, and the public is entitled to see it.
But a syllabus may also qualify as a piece of original creative work,
entitling its creator to copyright protection, which confers the right to
control how the work is reproduced and redistributed. For the university
presented with a request to produce the syllabus as a public record, the
dilemma becomes, to copy, or not to copy? To show how knotty the
problem is, two courts in different states, presented by the same plaintiff
with this very question, reached different outcomes.1
1. See Nat’l Council [on] Tchr. Quality, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 446 S.W.3d 723, 724
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While the collision between copyright law and public-records law has
seldom resulted in litigation, the potential for the former to swallow the
latter is ominous. Because the bar for a document to qualify as copyright
protected is low,2 a secretive government agency could manipulatively
use copyright protection to conceal studies, reports, and other documents
of undeniable public interest if copyright is understood to operate as a
trump card overriding the public’s right of access.
A reckoning in the not-distant future is likely, as government agencies
become repositories for more and more data and documents of
commercial value.3 While the demand for an in-house memo from a state
bureaucrat may be minimal, government agencies increasingly create or
accumulate commercially exploitable works, including databases and
GIS maps.4 As the stakes rise, the question of whether a government
agency can, or should, deny a public-records request because the
requested material qualifies for copyright protection will become less of
an academic question and more of a pressing practical one.5
Complicating the scenario, a case like the college syllabus request
presents thorny jurisdictional issues. Interpreting state freedom-ofinformation law is a matter of exclusive state-court jurisdiction,6 while
interpreting copyright law is committed to federal courts.7 When the two
issues coincide in one case—first, whether the requested document
qualifies as a public record subject to production under state law and
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (finding no obligation to produce copies of requested syllabi); Nat’l Council
on Tchr. Quality, Inc. v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 837 N.W.2d 314, 316 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013)
(finding that copyright did not excuse duty to produce requested syllabi). These cases are discussed
in detail in Section IV, infra.
2. See Lisa P. Wang, The Copyrightability of Legal Complaints, 45 B.C. L. REV. 705, 713
(2004) (stating that “[t]he level of creativity demanded by the originality requirement is extremely
low” for a work to qualify for copyright protection).
3. See Robert M. Gellman, Twin Evils: Government Copyright and Copyright-Like Controls
over Government Information, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1006 (1995) (“The case for unrestricted
public use of public data in the hands of government must be set out clearly now because the stakes
are higher than they were when information existed primarily on paper. . . . Government
bureaucracies have always displayed a tendency to control the information of their agencies, and
the temptation increases as the value and the uses of the information expand.”).
4. See Shubha Ghosh, Informing and Reforming the Marketplace of Ideas: The Public-Private
Model for Data Production and the First Amendment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 653, 655 (recognizing
that “corporate culture of commodification” that views data as an asset to be commercialized can
cause tension with socially desirable interests in maximizing public access to data).
5. See Barbara A. Petersen, Copyright and State Government: An Analysis of Section 119.083,
Florida’s Software Copyright Provision, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 441, 474 (1992) (criticizing
decision to protect state-produced software under copyright law as “a dangerous precedent for
copyrighting and marketing other public records with potential commercial value . . . .”).
6. See Chi. Trib. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 680 F.3d 1001, 1006 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding
no federal jurisdiction to adjudicate newspaper’s Illinois Freedom of Information Act claim).
7. See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing district
courts’ exclusive original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)).
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second, whether the document is eligible for copyright protection,
limiting the ability to reproduce and redistribute it—there may be no
single court appropriate to adjudicate both questions.
This Article proposes a way out: copyright law has no legitimate place
in the freedom-of-information discussion, because narrower alternatives
already exist to protect the relatively few records maintained by
government agencies for which copyright protection is arguably proper.
Section II explains the mechanics of state open-records law and the strong
presumption that the public is entitled to see (and copy) anything in the
government’s possession that memorializes information relating to the
conduct of public business. The section briefly describes how journalists,
researchers, and others who regularly need access to government
documents find public agencies resistant to disclosure, and why it would
be perilous to equip those agencies with a “get out of accountability free
card” by recognizing copyright as a categorical override of the duty to
disclose.
Section III then explains the well-established principle, under the
federal Copyright Act, that original works of creativity may not be
reproduced or redistributed without the consent of the creator and how
the “fair-use” doctrine occasionally makes reuse defensible. In Section
IV, the Article describes the first generation of cases in which courts have
been asked whether copyright law forecloses sharing a copy of a
document that would otherwise be subject to production as a public
record. Section V focuses on an especially tricky subset of copyright
versus FOIA cases, in which the government agency is not the creator of
work but merely the custodian of work created by commercial third
parties, whose interests in confidentiality may be more compelling than
the government’s.
In Section VI, the Article examines the jurisdictional puzzle presented
by a case in which areas of exclusive state jurisdiction and federal
jurisdiction intersect, and the practical problems presented by asking state
courts to adjudicate disputes that require construing copyright law.
Finally, Section VII recommends a path to reconcile the two bodies of
law in a way that gives effect to the principle, deeply ingrained in the
public-records law of every state, that the law should be interpreted to
maximize transparency.
II. THE STARTING POINT: THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO COPY
A. What’s a Public Record?
Every state and the federal government maintain statutes entitling the
public to inspect records that memorialize government agencies’

2021]

Copyright Versus the Right to Copy

163

activities.8 Many state statutes take their inspiration from the federal
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), enacted under the Johnson
administration in 1966.9
The federal FOIA statute enables the public to demand access to
records of any executive branch agency, including independent
regulatory agencies or government-controlled corporations.10 Agencies
must provide responsive records to requesters unless they fall within one
of nine enumerated exemptions.11 Commonly encountered exemptions
include those enabling agencies to withhold confidential information in
medical and personnel files, sensitive law enforcement information that
could imperil safety or compromise a fair trial, and internal “deliberative”
materials prior to a final agency decision.12 The Supreme Court has read
the statute to require that courts “narrowly construe FOIA’s exemptions
and resolve any ambiguity in favor of disclosure.”13
As with the federal law, state statutes are construed liberally toward
access, and exemptions are to be read narrowly to give broad effect to the
statutory purpose of maximizing public disclosure.14 As one court tartly
observed, “[A] person does not come—like a serf—hat in hand, seeking
permission of the lord to have access to public records. Access to public
records is a matter of right.”15 Several states explicitly codify the policy
objectives that animate freedom-of-information law. The Arkansas
Freedom of Information Act begins, “It is vital in a democratic society
that public business be performed in an open and public manner so that
the electors shall be advised of the performance of public officials and of
the decisions that are reached in public activity and in making public
policy.”16 The Texas Public Information Act explains in a preface,
8. See Linda B. Samuels, Protecting Confidential Business Information Supplied to State
Governments: Exempting Trade Secrets from State Open Records Laws, 27 AM. BUS. L. J. 467,
472 (1989) (“Every state now has on its books some type of freedom of information act or ‘open
records’ law.”). This Article will refer to state access laws as “FOI laws” or “FOI statutes” for short,
although not all use the “freedom of information” nomenclature.
9. See id. (observing that many states modeled their open records statutes after federal FOIA).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
12. See Tyler Prime & Joseph Russomanno, The Future of FOIA: Course Corrections for the
Digital Age, 23 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 267, 288 (2018) (characterizing these exemptions as the
most frequently cited, comprising seventy-seven percent of all cases studied in which documents
were withheld or redacted on the grounds of exemptions).
13. John C. Brinkerhoff Jr., FOIA’s Common Law, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 575, 577 (2019).
14. Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Statutes, 28 URB. LAW.
65, 66 (1996). See also S. Illinoisan v. Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 1, 21 (Ill. 2006) (“[T]he
FOIA is to be interpreted liberally, and the exemptions to disclosure are to be interpreted narrowly
. . . .”).
15. State ex rel. Athens Cnty. Prop. Owners Ass’n v. City of Athens, 619 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992).
16. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (2021).
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The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the
right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good
for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they
may retain control over the instruments they have created. The
provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to implement this
policy.17

Every state’s freedom-of-information statute provides that the right to
inspect a record includes the right of access to copies. This right is
increasingly important now that the understanding of what constitutes a
public record includes voluminous databases,18 which would hardly be
amenable to on-site inspection at the agency’s premises. It is increasingly
common for journalists and researchers to use their own computing
expertise to analyze thousands of data points obtained from government
agencies.19 It would be impossible to do such in-depth analysis without a
copy of the records. Because the ability to analyze and display data is so
valuable, statutes and judicial interpretations increasingly recognize that
the right to obtain data includes the ability to insist on receiving it in its
native form (i.e., a database, even one stored within third-party software),
rather than as a static document (such as a printout) that would be far less
amenable to analysis.20 Additionally, the ability to republish all or part of
17. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.001(a) (West 2013).
18. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Superior Ct., 302 P.3d 1026, 1039 (Cal. 2013) (finding that county’s
database of land tracts maintained in GIS format is a public record subject to disclosure under
California law); Comm’n on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Ct., 165 P.3d 462,
465 (Cal. 2007) (concluding that database of officers hired and terminated by California law
enforcement agencies qualifies under state law as a public record and is not categorically exempt
from disclosure).
19. See, e.g., Derek Willis, Eric Umansky & Moiz Syed, The NYPD Files, PROPUBLICA (July
26, 2020), https://projects.propublica.org/nypd-ccrb/ [https://perma.cc/NQ4W-P6DH] (analyzing
thirty-five years’ worth of complaints lodged against New York police officers based on data
obtained from civilian review board); Craig McCarthy & Stephen Stirling, How We Built the Most
Comprehensive Statewide Database of Police Force in the United States, NJ (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.nj.com/news/2018/11/how_we_built_the_most_comprehensive_statewide_database_
of_police_force_in_the_us.html [https://perma.cc/4DFN-N4EB] (explaining how journalists
gathered 72,677 use-of-force forms from police departments across New Jersey through more than
500 FOI requests, enabling them to build a searchable database of every reported use of force by
officers over a five-year period); see also Drew Armstrong, Data Heroes of Covid Tracking Project
Are Still Filling U.S. Government Void, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Nov. 20. 2020, 3:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-11-20/covid-tracking-project-volunteers-stepup-as-u-s-fails-during-pandemic [https://perma.cc/LB2S-XE4L] (describing how project launched
by three journalists and a data scientist became a source of daily COVID-19 updates more trusted
than U.S. government sites, by aggregating data obtained from agencies and healthcare facilities
throughout the country and verifying it).
20. See, e.g., State ex rel. Margolius v. City of Cleveland, 584 N.E.2d 665, 669 (Ohio 1992)
(holding that researcher was entitled to computer tapes on which police data was stored, because
the manner of storage was an essential part of the database and putting it into a different format
constituted an alteration of the record). As the court said there, “[A] public agency should not be
permitted to require the public to exhaust massive amounts of time and resources in order to
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a record contributes to credibility; a news account or research paper based
on handwritten notes from a visual inspection will lack the
trustworthiness of a report accompanied by the actual documents.21 And
journalists are not the only beneficiaries of the ability to duplicate records
and remove them from the government’s premises; people with visual
impairment or limited English proficiency might take copies off-site to
be adapted for their use or read aloud to them. The ability to make and
share copies of records obtained from government agencies thus carries
self-evident societal benefits.
B. The Challenge of Holding Government Accountable for Disclosure
Public records are behind a significant share of the journalism that
holds government agencies accountable and brings about reforms.
Scratch beneath the surface of any investigative reporting project and you
will almost certainly find a public-records request. In South Florida,
reporters with the Sun-Sentinel won the 2013 Pulitzer Prize for local
reporting by using transponder readings from highway toll plazas to
document reckless speeding by police officers.22 The Baltimore Sun used
contracts, purchase orders, and other public records to document a web
of corruption within city government and the local university hospital
system, resulting in the federal criminal prosecution of the sitting mayor
and a housecleaning at the University of Maryland Medical System.23
Effective public oversight of law enforcement agencies is especially
dependent on access to government records, because so much of the work
of police, prosecutors, and courts takes place beyond public view. Access
to public records enabled reporters to discover that Derek Chauvin, the
Minneapolis police officer who was convicted of the May 2020 murder
of an unarmed forty-six-year-old Black man, George Floyd, had been the
subject of eighteen misconduct complaints before the lethal encounter,
replicate the value added to the public records through the creation and storage on tape of a data
base containing such records.” Id.
21. See Craig Silverman, The Best Ways for Publishers to Build Credibility Through
Transparency,
AM.
PRESS
INST.
(Sept.
24,
2014),
https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/strategy-studies/transparencycredibility/single-page/ [https://perma.cc/H9HM-HTLP] (explaining how investigative news
organizations such as ProPublica are strengthening credibility by embedding links to original
source documents so readers can inspect underlying data for themselves).
22. See Sally Kestin & John Maines, Above the Law: Off-Duty Police Caught Driving from 90
to 130 MPH, IRE J., Spring 2012, at 16, 18 (explaining methodology reporters used to calculate
speed of police cruisers by obtaining readouts from automated toll-payment transponders using
Florida’s Public Records Act, and resistance that agencies presented before complying with
requests).
23. Jean Marbella, Baltimore Sun Wins Pulitzer Prize for Coverage of Mayor Catherine Pugh’s
‘Healthy
Holly’
Book
Scandal,
BALT.
SUN
(May
4,
2020),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-sun-pulitzer-win-20200504krx2g2jx35bdnfjr7mzwantwlm-story.html [https://perma.cc/57PZ-N3M4].
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almost all of which were dismissed without disciplinary consequences.24
Elsewhere, reporters have used public records to call attention to racial
disparities in criminal sentencing,25 police with checkered histories of
domestic violence,26 and ineffective prosecutors who allow rapes to go
unpunished.27 And academic researchers as well as journalists rely on
well-enforced public-records laws as a primary data source. Stanford
University researchers analyzed more than 100 million reports of traffic
stops by law enforcement agencies across the country and concluded that
“the bar for searching [B]lack and Hispanic drivers [is] lower than that
for searching white drivers.”28 Law professors from Duke University and
the University of Chicago obtained the personnel files of 98,000 certified
officers from more than 500 agencies across Florida to document the
phenomenon of the “wandering officer,” who gets fired from one law
enforcement agency but turns up working at another.29 Attorney James
Naughton has demonstrated how records obtained through FOIA requests
can expose racial inequities in the imposition of school discipline, which
disproportionately affects young people of color.30
Journalists, activists, researchers, and others who depend on access to
public records often find government agencies uncooperative with their
disclosure obligations, exploiting unclear statutory exemptions for
purposes of concealment. Across California, for instance, police
departments greeted the enactment of a new statute opening up police
24. Scottie Andrew, Derek Chauvin: What We Know About the Former Officer Convicted in
George
Floyd’s
Death,
CNN
(Apr.
20,
2021,
10:52
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/01/us/derek-chauvin-what-we-know-trnd/index.html
[https://perma.cc/V9RN-BE43].
25. Josh Salman, Emily Le Coz & Elizabeth Johnson, Florida’s Broken Sentencing System,
SARASOTA HERALD TRIB., (Dec. 12, 2016), http://projects.heraldtribune.com/bias/sentencing/
[https://perma.cc/R4PT-5EWE].
26. Kyle Hopkins, We Found 14 Villages That Hired Criminals as Cops. Here’s What the State
is Doing to Change That, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 21, 2019),
https://www.adn.com/lawless/2019/12/21/we-found-14-villages-that-hired-criminals-as-copsheres-what-the-state-is-doing-to-change-that/ [https://perma.cc/CB3Y-TD6S].
27. Brandon Stahl, Jennifer Bjorhus & MaryJo Webster, When Rape Is Reported and Nothing
Happens, STAR TRIB. (July 22, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/when-rape-is-reported-inminnesota-and-nothing-happens-denied-justice-special-report-part-one/487130861/
[https://perma.cc/3JSG-BL95].
28. Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across
the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 736, 739 (2020); see also Jason Buch & Joy
Borkholder, Report: Washington State Patrol Singles Out Native American Drivers, THE
SPOKESMAN-REV. (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2020/jan/02/reportwashington-state-patrol-singles-out-native-/ [https://perma.cc/7UT7-GZRY] (quoting Stanford
study).
29. Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 129 YALE L.J. 1676, 1682
(2020).
30. James Naughton, The School FOIA Project: Uncovering Racial Disparities in School Discipline and How to Respond, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1045 (2021).
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officers’ disciplinary files for public inspection by shredding their files to
avoid disclosure.31 Agencies bent on inflicting delay and financial
hardship have adopted the tactic of preemptively filing man-bites-dog
lawsuits against FOI requesters, with the effect of denying the requesters
“prevailing plaintiff” status for purposes of an attorney fee award.32 On
occasion, the zeal to conceal rises to criminality. In Atlanta, a former
mayoral aide was convicted of a misdemeanor after she was caught
texting other city officials to intentionally slow-walk requests for
financial records embarrassing to the mayor and to produce the
documents in an unusable format.33
More commonly, agencies aggressively interpret statutory exemptions
to FOI laws or interpose barriers in the form of delays or prohibitive fees
in ways that may technically be legal but strain the statutory presumption
of openness.34 In one notable case, the State of Connecticut tried to
charge the Hartford Courant newspaper a fee of twenty-five dollars per
entry for access to the state’s database of criminal “rap sheets”; the
potential $20.3 million bill forced the newspaper to sue for access.35
Agencies are increasingly assessing not just nominal copying fees for
access to their records, but onerous hourly search and retrieval fees that,
as a practical matter, are tantamount to a denial.36 Even where statutes
ostensibly establish deadlines for producing responsive documents, those

31. See Annie Gilbertson, California Cops Are Withholding Public Records Despite New Law
Saying They Can’t, LAIST (June 30, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://laist.com/2019/06/30/
california_police_agencies_withhold_public_records_transparency_law.php
[https://perma.cc/9JVC-ATQ4] (“Some law enforcement organizations are charging high fees for
records, destroying documents and even ignoring court orders to produce the files.”).
32. Jonathan Peters, When Governments Sue Public-Records Requesters, COLUM. J. REV. (June
30, 2015), https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/when_governments_sue_public_record_
requesters.php [https://perma.cc/9FVY-G7XM].
33. J. Scott Trubey, Ex-Reed Aide First Official Convicted of Public Records Violations,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/reed-aide-first-official-convictedpublic-records-violations/ImqpLWZLh9aMU89t6vcwtI/ [https://perma.cc/G4FX-PXYD].
34. See Delayed, Denied, Dismissed: Failures on the FOIA Front, PROPUBLICA (July 21, 2016,
8:01 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/delayed-denied-dismissed-failures-on-the-foia-front
[https://perma.cc/YBC7-PJNK] (“Local, state and federal agencies alike routinely blow through
deadlines laid out in law or bend them to ludicrous degrees, stretching out even the simplest
requests for years.”). In the article, journalists with the ProPublica investigative reporting
collaborative share their worst experiences trying to obtain records from uncooperative government
agencies. Id. One reporter recounted fighting the Defense Department for three and one-half years
just to be summarily denied, and another caught a New York state agency lying about the existence
of records. Id.
35. Hartford Courant Co. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 801 A.2d 759, 762–63 (Conn. 2002).
36. See Tae Ho Lee, Public Records Fees Hidden in the Law: A Study of Conflicting Judicial
Approaches to the Determination of the Scope of Imposable Public Records Fees, 21 COMMC’N L.
& POL’Y 251, 252 (2016) (“Despite the growing concern over high public records fees, several
state governments have attempted to recoup more expenses under the executory authority, charging
hourly fees for the labor costs incurred for tasks involving research, redaction or review . . . .”).
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deadlines are widely ignored without consequence for the agency; it is
not unheard of for a federal FOIA request to sit unfulfilled for as long as
twenty years.37 Compliance went from “sluggish” to “nonexistent” at
many agencies when the COVID-19 pandemic struck the United States
in 2020, causing some government officials to suspend fulfillment of
information requests entirely—at a time when hunger for reliable publichealth data was at its highest.38 Because resolving disputes can require
both exhausting internal agency appeals and multiple rounds of litigation,
FOI law ends up favoring the hidebound agency over the requester as a
practical matter.39
News reporting and other government watchdog activity often require
access to reports, studies, and other records that would readily pass the
test of being sufficiently original and creative to qualify for copyright
protection. Journalists regularly refer to and publish excerpts from audit
reports or inspector general reports that reflect originality and creative
investment by their authors.40 The ability to obtain, copy, and republish
government documents and data is foundational to journalism,
documentary filmmaking, academic research, and nonprofit advocacy. If
copyright were allowed to override access to and use of government
37. See Joe Regalia, The Common Law Right to Information, 18 RICH. J. L. & PUB. INT. 89, 92
(2015) (“[A]gency backlogs and procedural hurdles have substantially reduced [FOI laws’]
efficacy.”).
38. See Colin Lecher, States Are Suspending Public Records Access Due to COVID-19, THE
MARKUP (May 1, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/coronavirus/2020/05/01/states-aresuspending-public-records-access-due-to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/WY3H-N3WT] (stating that
in response to the pandemic, several jurisdictions have reduced or suspended access to public
records).
39. See Regalia, supra note 37, at 119 (“For agencies applying a ‘deny first’ approach to
document requests . . ., FOIA may create costs and hurdles by dissuading individuals from
combating the agency machine.”).
40. See Andrea Eger, ‘Epic Owes Oklahoma $8.9 Million’: Improper Transfers, Chronic
Misreporting Found by State Auditor’s Investigation, TULSA WORLD (Nov. 8, 2020),
https://tulsaworld.com/news/local/education/epic-owes-oklahoma-8-9-million-impropertransfers-chronic-misreporting-found-by-state-auditors-investigation/article_f8a41072-01e211eb-9691-976475d9051b.html [https://perma.cc/PR79-8Z4Z] (reporting on investigative state
audit report disclosing that a failure in oversight by local school boards enabled operators of a
controversial Oklahoma charter school to enrich themselves at taxpayer expense); Mark Bowes,
Inspector General: Va. Parole Board Violated Law, Policies in Releasing Killer of Richmond
Officer, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Aug. 6, 2020), https://richmond.com/news/local/crime/inspectorgeneral-va-parole-board-violated-law-policies-in-releasing-killer-of-richmondofficer/article_c23bb495-e44c-588a-a021-652dd69ab3f4.html
[https://perma.cc/SRL4-UL8R]
(quoting state investigator’s report that found irregularities in state parole board’s handling of
murder case, including failure to make diligent efforts to notify victim’s family or elicit victim
impact statements); Russ McQuaid, Audit: Marion County Inmates Being Held Hours, Sometimes
Days After Posting Bond, FOX59.COM (Nov. 27, 2017, 7:32 PM), https://fox59.com/news/auditmarion-county-inmates-being-held-hours-sometimes-days-after-posting-bond/
[https://perma.cc/W26K-M3MS] (reporting contents of internal audit of Indiana county jail, which
found detainees needlessly “languishing” for hours or even days after release ordered, contributing
to jail overcrowding).
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records, the losses to these fields would be incalculable.
Because of agencies’ well-documented history of manipulating FOI
laws to obstruct public oversight, any effort to exempt categories of
documents should be viewed skeptically. If copyright becomes widely
recognized as trumping the public’s right to inspect or copy government
records, the question is not whether the exemption will be abused, but
how badly it will be abused.41
III. WHAT’S PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT: (ALMOST) EVERYTHING
A. Little Dab of Originality and Creativity Will Do
The Constitution gives Congress the power to provide authors with
exclusive right to their creative work “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts . . . .”42 The paramount purpose of copyright is
to promote greater access to knowledge.43 Although creative artists
benefit financially from the ability to redistribute and adapt their work,
the primary intended beneficiary of copyright is the public.44 There is a
recognized civic component to copyright, as Professor Neil Netanel has
written: “[C]opyright aims to increase and make widely available the
store of knowledge required for effective citizenship and civic
association. . . . [I]t enhances civil society’s participatory character.
Through economic incentives and a careful balance between exclusivity
and access, copyright seeks to foster widespread citizen participation in
public deliberation.”45
The scope of what qualifies for copyright protection is purposefully
broad. Federal courts have read the constitutional term “writings” to
include any physical rendering of the fruits of creative labor, so long as
they have been reduced to tangible form.46 The requirement of “fixation”
simply has come to mean that an inchoate idea or concept alone cannot
41. See Gellman, supra note 3, at 1009–10 (observing that, if copyright is understood to apply
to government documents, governments could be selective in their enforcement activities, targeting
those requesters with whose viewpoints they disagree).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
43. See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or
Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 842 (2010) (“. . . [T]he goals of copyright, as stated
in the preamble to Article I, § 8 [are] . . . promoting the creation and dissemination of more and
better creative works.”).
44. See id. at 840 (“Although the vehicle for achieving this goal was to be the conferral of
certain exclusive rights, for a limited duration, on the creators of copyrightable material or their
assignees or heirs, the intended beneficiaries of this system were the members of the public.”).
45. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
363–64 (1996).
46. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (“[A]lthough the word ‘writings’
might be limited to script or printed material, it may be interpreted to include any physical rendering
of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”).
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be the subject of an infringement claim.47
As of 1989, when the United States Congress ratified the terms of the
international Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works, copyright has become automatically effective as soon as a
creative work is committed to a tangible medium.48 Registration with the
U.S. Copyright Office within the Library of Congress, long required
before a work could be regarded as copyright-protected, is today
necessary only as a prerequisite to suing to enforce a copyright.49
The Copyright Act extends copyright protection only to works of
authorship that are “original.”50 The Supreme Court gave its authoritative
word on what is required for a work to qualify for copyright in Feist
Publications v. Rural Telephone Service.51 While the Court denied
copyrightability to a white pages telephone directory because an
alphabetical list of names and addresses is purely factual and lacks
creativity, the Court set a minimal bar for copyrightability in future cases:
“To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a
slight amount will suffice.”52 Thus, two conditions must be satisfied for
the work to be original and copyrightable. First, the work must be
independently originated by the author rather than copied from other
sources. Second, the work must display a minimal degree of creativity,
meaning that a purely factual work would not qualify.
Although a short string of commonplace words (“Have a nice day”)
could never cross the threshold of sufficient originality and creativity to
be protected by copyright, courts have recognized infringement claims
involving rather short passages.53 Personal letters, even unpublished

47. See Andrien v. S. Ocean City Chamber of Com., 927 F.2d 132, 134 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“Copyright is available only for the expression of a work of authorship, not for a mere idea.”).
48. Tom James, Copyright Enforcement: Time to Abolish the Pre-Litigation Registration
Requirement, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 104.
49. Tarla S. Atwell, Note, Timing Means Everything!, 12 J. MARSHALL L.J. 59, 61, 64 (2018–
19); see also 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United
States work shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.”).
50. See 17 U.S.C § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship . . . .”).
51. See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
52. Id. at 345. See also id. at 361–62 (holding that a white pages telephone directory cannot
receive copyright protection because “names, towns, and telephone numbers of [utility’s]
subscribers” were “uncopyrightable facts,” and the contents of white pages were not arranged in an
original way).
53. For instance, in a 2003 ruling, a federal appeals court affirmed a copyright infringement
claim against an advertising agency that was found to have reused a portion of an artist’s copyrightprotected phrase—“Most people don’t know that there are angels whose only job is to make sure
you don’t get too comfortable & fall asleep & miss your life”—in an advertisement for Audi
automobiles. Andreas v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 789, 791 (8th Cir. 2003).
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ones, can satisfy the prerequisites to be protected by copyright.54 In an
especially memorable case, the Second Circuit decided that reclusive
novelist J.D. Salinger had a protectable copyright interest in personal
letters sent to friends that were incorporated into a book about Salinger’s
life without his consent.55 “Salinger has a right to protect the expressive
content of his unpublished writings for the term of his copyright, and that
right prevails over a claim of fair use . . . ,” the court stated. “Public
awareness of the expressive content of the letters will have to await either
Salinger’s decision to publish or the expiration of his copyright, save for
such special circumstances as might fall within the ‘narrower’ scope of
fair use available for unpublished works.”56
Copyright’s heightened deference to creators’ control over work that
has not yet been published could have a significant impact on the
accessibility of government data and documents that must be extracted
from agencies by way of FOI request—the records that government
actors would most strongly prefer to keep secret. Even a piece of
correspondence as informal and seemingly ephemeral as an email can
qualify for copyright protection.57 So, it is not a stretch to imagine that a
substantial share of the documents produced each day in response to FOI
requests could qualify for copyright protection, if state law allows it and
if the creator decides to assert it.
Ordinarily, any legal constraint on publishing lawfully obtained
material would run afoul of the First Amendment, which is understood to
disfavor the use of the courts to restrain speech before it can be read or
heard.58 But federal courts have concluded that the Copyright Act fully
accommodates First Amendment interests, without the need for an
independent constitutional inquiry, for two reasons. First, copyright does
not prevent the use of facts or ideas derived from the works of others.59
54. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (“The author of letters
is entitled to a copyright in the letters, as with any other work of literary authorship.”); see also
William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works: An
Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79, 79 (1992) (stating that unpublished works including
letters diaries, journals, and reports are “surely copyrightable”).
55. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 92–94 (describing facts of the case).
56. Id. at 100.
57. See Edina Harbinja, Legal Nature of Emails: A Comparative Perspective, 14 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 227, 233–35 (2016) (explaining that a typical email would satisfy the threshold
preconditions under U.S. law of being fixed in a tangible medium, original, and creative).
58. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (recognizing the First Amendment
offers “special protection” against government directives that operate as prior restraints on
distributing speech).
59. See United Video, Inc. v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Although there is
some tension between the Constitution’s copyright clause and the first amendment, the familiar
idea/expression dichotomy of copyright law, under which ideas are free but their particular
expression can be copyrighted, has always been held to give adequate protection to free
expression.”).
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Second, fair use facilitates free speech by enabling speakers to comment
on, and republish parts of, the works of others.60 For those reasons, courts
typically do not apply traditional First Amendment principles to a request
for copyright remedies; once it is established that a record is protected by
copyright, courts do not independently analyze whether restraining its
redistribution would unduly curtail free speech.61
The Copyright Act explicitly states that works created by the U.S.
government are not eligible for copyright protection.62 However, Section
105 of the Act allows the federal government to hold copyrights assigned
by others and does not address the work of third-party contractors hired
by the government. The Act does not similarly preclude state or local
government entities from obtaining copyright protection for work their
employees create.63 State laws vary considerably as to whether, and
under what circumstances, a state or local agency may obtain copyright
protection for government-created works.64
B. The Fair-Use Workaround
Essentially as long as copyright has existed, courts have recognized
that the law’s exclusivity cannot entirely forbid one creator from
referencing the creative work of another without stifling the evolution of
knowledge and culture.65 Congress codified the long-recognized
common law doctrine of fair use in 1976, creating a statutory workaround
that allows for reusing copyright-protected work for certain socially
beneficial purposes that do not devalue the original work.66 The doctrine
60. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (observing that fair-use defense
accommodates First Amendment concerns by providing accommodation for scholarship and
commentary).
61. See id. at 221 (concluding that, beyond analyzing whether Copyright Act applies, “further
First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary”); see also Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment as a
Check on Copyright Rights, 23 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 587, 589 (2001) (“Having found
that copyright law embodies First Amendment interests, courts find it unnecessary, if not redundant,
to entertain any additional First Amendment arguments made by litigants.”).
62. “Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States
Government, but the United States Government is not precluded from receiving and holding
copyrights transferred to it by assignment, bequest, or otherwise.” 17 U.S.C. § 105(a).
63. See Bldg. Offs. & Code Adm’rs Int’l, Inc. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735–36 (1st
Cir. 1980) (“Works of state governments are . . . left available for copyright protection by the state
or the individual author, . . . .”).
64. See Ashley Messenger & Dennis Pitman, Can States Use Copyright to Restrict the Use of
Public Records?, COMMC’NS LAW., Spring 2013, at 4, 7 (“The status of copyright protection for
government records and publications at the state level is wildly variable among jurisdictions.”).
65. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (“From the infancy of
copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought
necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose [of stimulating progress in science and the arts].”).
66. See James Hall, Comment, Bare-Faced Mess: Fair Use and the First Amendment, 70 OR.
L. REV. 211, 217 (1991) (explaining that between two cases, decided in 1967 and 1978, Congress
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of “fair use” provides that an otherwise-infringing reuse of copyrightprotected work can be defensible, based on a balancing test that assesses
how the republisher used the work and how the reuse affected its value.67
Fair use is an affirmative defense that arises once the prima facie elements
of infringement have been established.68
In assessing whether a republication of protected work qualifies as
“fair,” a court will apply a four-factor analysis codified in Section 107 of
the Copyright Act:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.69

The Copyright Act recognizes certain categories of reuse as uniquely
societally valuable and therefore entitled to an extra measure of leeway
in the fair-use analysis: criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, and research.70 However, this does not mean any use
meeting one of the six statutorily recognized categories will
automatically qualify as “fair.”71 Rather, fair use is an intensely fact- and
context-specific inquiry, which makes the outcome difficult to predict
with assurance.72
C. Copyright as a Statutory FOI Exemption
Only a handful of state FOI laws expressly refer to copyright. Statutes
in Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota explicitly identify copyright as a
limit on a requester’s ability to obtain duplicates of records.73 The
codified the fair-use doctrine, intending courts to apply it flexibly and weigh the public utility of
copyright-protected works above other factors).
67. See Frank J. Lukes, Comment, The Public Good v. A Monetary Profit: The News
Organizations’ Utilization of the Fair Use Doctrine, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 841,
846 (2012) (explaining application of fair-use factors).
68. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (“Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its proponent
would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without favorable evidence
about relevant markets.”).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
70. See id. (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright.”).
71. See Bauer, supra note 43, at 852 (“[I]t does not follow that all instances of these six forms
of conduct will be deemed ‘fair use.’”).
72. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he determination of fair use is
an open-ended and context-sensitive inquiry.”).
73. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-219(a) (2010) (“A public agency shall not be required to provide
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Wisconsin and Utah FOI statutes arguably go even farther. Wisconsin
excludes from the threshold definition of a public record any document
“to which access is limited by copyright, patent, or bequest,”74 while
Utah defines public records to exclude “material to which access is
limited by the laws of copyright or patent unless the copyright or patent
is owned by a governmental entity or political subdivision . . . .”75 By
defining public records to exclude records to which copyright limits
access, the Wisconsin and Utah laws can be read to suggest that copyright
is a barrier not just to duplicating records but even to viewing them; once
a document ceases to be a public record at all, citizens cannot invoke the
state FOI statute to insist on seeing it.
By contrast, other references to copyright in the context of FOI statutes
are more benign. Nevada refers to copyright only for the purpose of
emphasizing that a third party’s copyright-protected interests are
unimpaired by sharing a document with a state agency; the statute does
not indicate that copyright overrides the state-guaranteed right of
access.76
Colorado and Indiana are outliers in specifically addressing the
interaction of copyright and FOI law by statute. Indiana’s Access to
Public Records Law states that the public’s right of access should not be
compromised by the obligation to pay licensing fees to inspect public
documents that might qualify for copyright protection.77 The Colorado
Open Records Act recognizes that government agencies can obtain
copyright protection of records that qualify as open records but specifies
that the government’s copyright interests “shall not restrict public access
to or fair use of copyrighted materials . . . .”78 Outside of this handful of
statutes, state law is generally ambiguous about whether the copyright
status of records interferes with the ability to inspect or duplicate them.79
As states became increasingly sophisticated in developing their own
[such items or devices] . . . which are copyrighted by a person other than the public agency.”); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 84-712(1) (2013) (providing that requesters are entitled to receive a copy of public
records “except if federal copyright law otherwise provides”); S.D. Codified Laws § 1-27-1 (2009)
(assuring requesters of the right to copy public records “unless federal copyright law otherwise
provides”).
74. WIS. STAT. § 19.32(2) (2020).
75. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-103(22)(b)(iv) (West 2021).
76. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010(1) (2020) (“This section does not supersede or in any
manner affect the federal laws governing copyrights or enlarge, diminish or affect in any other
manner the rights of a person in any written book or record which is copyrighted pursuant to federal
law.”).
77. See IND. CODE § 5-14-3-3(g)(2) (2019) (stating that agencies may not enter into contracts
conditioning the public’s right to inspect and copy documents on the payment of royalties or
licensing fees, except where expressly authorized by statute).
78. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203(4) (2016).
79. Messenger & Pitman, supra note 64, at 5.
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computer programs, the possibility of being forced to produce duplicates
of commercially valuable software became a matter of special concern.
Several states have dealt with this concern by narrow carve-outs in their
FOI laws that exclude software from the definition of a publicly
accessible record.80
The relative dearth of references to copyright in state FOI statutes may
indicate, by silence, that legislatures do not widely consider copyright to
be an excuse for defying the statutory duty to furnish public records.
Alternatively, it may indicate that lawmakers believe copyright law is
already subsumed within the catch-all exemptions in many states that
withhold access to public records where federal law affirmatively forbids
disclosure. Or the silence may simply indicate a failure to detect and
grapple with the tension between the two bodies of law, leaving the task
to courts and attorneys general—which, as we shall see, have reached
diverging resolutions.
D. The Status of the Statutes: Who “Owns” the Law?
Compilations of statutes are an especially salient example of a statecreated record that the government has an interest in “paywalling,” and
the public has an interest in obtaining without charge. It is difficult to
think of any government record to which public access is more essential.
Ordinarily, access to government records is not regarded as a
constitutionally based entitlement; requesters normally must look to the
statute books as the source of their right.81 But if those statute books are
themselves the subject of the dispute, significant due process interests are
implicated. Where the law is viewable only by those who can pay for
access, it raises fundamental constitutional and public-policy questions to
hold people responsible for complying with laws they cannot afford to
see.82 For that reason, the Supreme Court has long held that “the law” is
80. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(7)(B) (2015) (‘“Public records’ does not mean
software acquired by purchase, lease, or license.”); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254.9(a) (1988)
(“Computer software developed by a state or local agency is not itself a public record under this
chapter.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203(3.5)(a)(III)(b)(I) (2018) (providing that agencies are not
required to produce records in their native digital format if doing so “would violate the terms of
any copyright or licensing agreement between the custodian and a third party . . . .”); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 15.232(i) (2018) (“Public record does not include computer software.”); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 44-04-18.4(2) (2019) (defining “proprietary information” exempt from production to include “[a]
computer software program and components of a computer software program which are subject to
a copyright or a patent . . . .” and “trade secrets” to mean “information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, technical know-how, or process” with inherent
economic value and reasonably requires secrecy).
81. See McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221, 232 (2013) (“This Court has repeatedly made clear
that there is no constitutional right to obtain all the information provided by FOIA laws.”).
82. See Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights in Primary Law Materials, 23
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not protectable by copyright.83 But, until recently, the Court left open the
possibility that a compilation of laws with some additional creative
content might qualify for copyright protection.
This dispute reached the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org.84 In Public.Resource.Org, the State of
Georgia tried to assert copyright ownership over the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), contending that the compilation of
annotations reflected the original creative decisions of a committee of
legislators and their staff.85 The state’s Code Revision Commission, a
body of legislators responsible for the annotations, sued the operators of
the website Public.Resource.Org after the organization scanned all 186
printed volumes and supplements of the annotated code and posted them
on a publicly accessible website, undercutting the state’s exclusive
publishing contract with LexisNexis.86
The district court, relying on a string of case law dating back to the
nineteenth century, as well as a reference within the Copyright Act to
“annotations” as eligible for protection, found the O.C.G.A. to be
copyright protected.87 The judge then analyzed whether
Public.Resource.Org might be entitled to a fair-use defense but concluded
that the use was not defensible; the entirety of the code was copied and
republished, and the availability of a free version online would drastically
reduce demand for the state’s own version.88 On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, invoking the broad principle that statutes inherently
belong to the public, not to individual government employees: “[T]he
constructive authors of those official legal promulgations of government
that represent an exercise of sovereign authority. And because they are
the authors, the People are the owners of these works, meaning that the
works are intrinsically public domain material and, therefore,
uncopyrightable.”89 But the Supreme Court decided the case on relatively
narrow and fact-specific grounds: that legislators are, categorically,
HASTINGS COMMC’N & ENT. L.J. 81, 89 (2000) (explaining that courts have long disfavored
copyright protection for compilations of statutes or judicial opinions, based on public policy
principles that value access).
83. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 252–54 (1888) (holding that, due to public policy
concerns, there is a judicial consensus that official works of judicial officers cannot be copyrighted).
84. Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
85. Id. at 1504–05.
86. Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1350, 1354 (N.D.
Ga. 2017), rev’d, 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018).
87. Id. at 1356.
88. See id. at 1358–61 (concluding defendant was unable to meet the burden of proving fair use
because “wholesale copying of the copyrighted annotations . . . would hinder the economic viability
of creating and maintaining the O.C.G.A.”).
89. Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org., Inc., 906 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir.
2018), aff’d, 140 S. Ct. 1498 (2020).
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unable to be the “authors” of work they create in the course of their
legislative duties.90
Because of the posture in which it arose and the narrowness of its
ultimate holding, Public.Resource.Org does not settle the question of
how to resolve a case in which a public-records requester asserts a
statutory right to receive a copy of records that could qualify for copyright
protection. Answering that question requires looking, first, at the handful
of times in which state courts have been asked to referee which legal right
is superior when there is a seemingly direct conflict between the right to
obtain government records and the right to withhold them to protect
copyright interests.
IV. WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VS. PUBLIC
PROPERTY
A. It’s On the Syllabus . . . If You Can Find It
Two fraternal (but not identical) twin cases at the intersection of
copyright and FOI law arose from researchers’ attempt to gain access to
the course syllabi used in college teacher-education classes. The outcome
of these cases demonstrates how challenging it is to harmonize the
creator’s interest in retaining control of a work with the public’s interest
in seeing the contents of that work when the “work” is a government
document.
The National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) is a nonprofit think
tank that began its life as an outgrowth of the conservative Fordham
Institute, although it self-identifies as nonpartisan and non-ideological.91
Since 2013, the NCTQ has published an annual report of its assessment
of the adequacy of teacher-education programs at postsecondary
institutions around the country, drawing on freedom-of-information
requests as one tool to obtain information about how future teachers are
educated.92 In pursuit of records about teacher-training programs, the
NCTQ filed public-records requests with, among others, state universities
in Minnesota and Missouri, meeting resistance in each instance. The
organization sued to assert its right of access to records from public
90. Public.Resource.Org., 140 S. Ct. at 1506.
91. See generally Diane Ravitch, What Is NCTQ? (And Why You Should Know), WASH. POST
(May 24, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/ravitch-what-is-nctqand-why-you-should-know/2012/05/23/gJQAg7CrlU_blog.html [https://perma.cc/U2SM-7S9G]
(describing history of NCTQ); see NAT’L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, Our Approach,
https://www.nctq.org/about/approach [https://perma.cc/5CP4-KP4G] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021)
(“The National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) is a nonpartisan, not-for-profit research and
policy organization that is committed to modernizing the teaching profession.”).
92. NAT’L COUNCIL ON TCHR. QUALITY, Teacher Prep Review, https://www.nctq.org/review
[https://perma.cc/48JB-HL2M] (last visited Sept. 17, 2021).
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institutions, and that is where the two cases began their divergent paths.
In Minnesota, the state Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the requester,
finding that the state’s Data Practices Act entitled the NCTQ to copy the
requested syllabi.93 The court agreed with the university system’s
position that “the data practices act cannot be construed so as to require
an agency or state actor to violate the copyright act.”94 But the court
found no direct conflict between the state’s legal obligations under
federal and state law, because the requester’s contemplated use of the
syllabi—for research and critique—was a fair use.95 The court noted that,
although Minnesota law forbids compelling a requester to justify the
reason for making the request, the NCTQ voluntarily disclosed its plans
for using the documents.96 Additionally, the court questioned the
assertion that the rightsholder could pursue an infringement action
against the university system if NCTQ exceeded the bounds of fair use;
in that event, the court said, the full range of Copyright Act remedies
would be available against NCTQ as the infringer, not the university.97
In Missouri, however, an appellate court considering a dispute over an
identical records request by NCTQ reached a different result. There, the
Missouri Court of Appeals determined that NCTQ was not entitled to
copies of syllabi from the University of Missouri, because making a copy
would compromise the exclusive ownership rights of the faculty creators,
placing the university in violation of the Copyright Act.98 The court relied
on a 1987 Missouri attorney general’s advisory opinion, which concluded
that the Missouri Sunshine Law’s exception for records “protected from
disclosure by law” extends to records protected by the Copyright Act.99
While copyright did not foreclose inspecting the syllabi, the NCTQ
would be satisfied only with copies, and the Missouri court refused to
follow the Minnesota ruling of a year earlier that furnishing a copy would

93. Nat’l Council on Tchr. Quality v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 837 N.W.2d 314, 320 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2013) [hereinafter referred to as NCTQ Minnesota, for clarity].
94. Id. at 318.
95. See id. at 319 (“[The court found that there is] a nonconflicting interpretation and application
of federal and state law: although state law prohibits a data-practices respondent from demanding
a fair-use justification, it does not prohibit it from recognizing that one exists.”).
96. See id. at 318–19 (“Although MnSCU did not request a fair-use justification, the NCTQ
volunteered one anyway when it replied to MnSCU’s stated copyright-infringement concerns.”).
97. See id. at 319 (“[T]he district court observed . . . [that all] of the author’s rights and remedies
under the FCA are unimpeded.”).
98. See Nat’l Council [on] Tchr. Quality, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 446 S.W.3d 723, 728
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014) [hereinafter referred to as NCTQ Missouri, for clarity] (“Disclosing the syllabi
to the NCTQ—through reproduction and distribution—would constitute a violation of the Federal
Copyright Act.”). The official caption of the case slightly misstates the name of the requesting
organization, which is the National Council on Teacher Quality.
99. Id., citing Mo. A.G. Op. No. 138-87 (1987).
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be a non-infringing fair use.100 The court concluded that fair use has no
place in the analysis of whether a record is subject to disclosure under
state open-records law, for two reasons. First, a state court cannot
adjudicate whether a use is fair, because the Copyright Act assigns that
determination exclusively to the federal courts. Second, an agency will
be in no position to evaluate the “fairness” of the document’s ultimate
use, since the record must first be produced before the requester can use
it.101 Simply put, the court decided “the fair use doctrine does not work
in the context of Sunshine Law requests.”102
B. Clear Photos, Murky Law: Pictometry and the Uncertain Right to
Duplicate Copyright-Protected Records
The struggle to reconcile copyright law with freedom-of-information
law epitomized by these parallel cases has played out a handful of other
times in judicial rulings and interpretations by state attorneys general.
The disparate results of these analyses reflect differing ideas about how
copyright and fair-use principles play out in the context of records created
or obtained by a public entity—and how intensely fact-specific these
judgments can be. The handful of published interpretations reflects a
close split over whether copyright protection impairs the public’s right to
copy records under FOI law.
In a case that forebodes peril for the accessibility of public records with
commercial value, Pictometry International v. Freedom of Information
Commission, Connecticut courts decided that, once a document qualifies
for copyright protection, it ceases to be a “public record” at all.103 In
Pictometry, a corporate vendor of high-resolution aerial photography
services contracted with the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP), granting the state agency a license to use its images,
software, and metadata.104 The agreement gave the state agency the right
to reproduce the images for use by individuals not covered by the
agreement for twenty-five dollars per image.105
The court examined whether Connecticut’s Freedom of Information
Act is preempted by the Copyright Act to the extent that FOIA permits
copying and distributing copyright-protected materials without the
permission of the rightsholder. Even if preemption applies, the requester
argued that the fair-use doctrine may permit copying and disseminating

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 729–30.
Id.
Id. at 730.
Pictometry Int’l Corp. v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n., 59 A.3d 172, 187 (Conn. 2013).
Id. at 176–77.
Id.
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public documents without the creator’s consent.106
The DEP took the position that the images were not public records at
all, because they fell into an exemption in Connecticut’s public-records
statute for records whose release is governed by a conflicting federal law.
The court agreed with the state’s position, holding that the Copyright Act
would override any portion of Connecticut’s FOI law compelling the
provision of copies.107 The case does not address whether a demand to
simply inspect copyright-protected maps, rather than to make copies,
would have produced a different outcome. If (as the decision suggests) a
record ceases to qualify as “public” if it is protected by copyright, a
requester would have no statutory entitlement to copy or view it—an
especially great threat to transparency and accountability.108
In addition to the Connecticut courts in Pictometry, courts and
attorneys general in at least a dozen other states have grappled with the
interplay of copyright and FOI law, with varying results.
1. Copyright Permits Both Viewing and Duplicating
In addition to the Minnesota court’s decision in the NCTQ syllabus
case, courts in California, New York, Ohio, and Washington have held
that the right to inspect and copy records includes records that qualify for
copyright protection.109 The state attorneys general in Hawaii and
Michigan have reached the same conclusion.110 In some instances, the
decision is based on the conclusion that FOI law simply does not
contemplate restricting public access on copyright grounds,111 but in
other instances, the decision is based on the conclusion that the
106. Id. at 187.
107. Id.
108. For a similar view, see the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in State ex rel. Gambill v.
Opperman, 986 N.E.2d 931, 936 (Ohio 2013), in which the majority held that a Public Records Act
requester was not entitled to a county property appraiser’s database in its native digital form
because the data was embedded within copyright-protected third-party software licensed to the
county, and that the requester’s only option was to pay $2,000 to have the data extracted from the
software, in a format less useful to the requester.
109. See Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Ct., 170 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1308 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (holding “unrestricted disclosure” of public records required even for documents protected
by copyright law); Pennington v. Clark, 791 N.Y.S.2d 774, 776 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding no
copyright violation for subjecting a videotape, which is public record, to disclosure); State ex rel.
Rea v. Ohio Dep’t of Educ., 692 N.E.2d 596, 602 (Ohio 1998) (holding intellectual property record
exception prevents public-record disclosure for private gain but not to further state’s educational
goals); see Lindberg v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 948 P.2d 805, 814 (Wash. 1997) (en banc) (holding that
“fair use” constitutes exception to copyright laws).
110. Copyrighted Ins. Bureau Filings Subject to Disclosure, Op. Mich. Att’y Gen. No. 6965,
1998 WL 15038, at *3 (Jan. 16, 1998); Pub. Inspection and Duplication of Bldg. Plans and Permit
Applications, Haw. Att’y Gen. OIP Op. Ltr. No. 90-20, 1990 WL 482368, at *1 (June 12, 1990).
111. See Cnty. of Santa Clara, 170 Cal. App. 4th at 1335 (“[The California Public Records Act]
would be undercut by permitting the County to place extra-statutory restrictions on the records that
it must produce . . . .”).
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requester’s planned use would qualify as a nonactionable fair use under
copyright law. In the latter category, Washington’s Supreme Court
decided citizen requesters were entitled to inspect and duplicate
engineering drawings created by a developer and filed with a county
permitting authority, because the requesters’ planned use—to inform
themselves for purposes of commenting on the development—qualified
as a fair use.112 When courts decide freedom-of-information cases based
on fair use, they are implicitly recognizing that copyright can prevent
inspection or copying of records, depending on how a requester intends
to use the records.
2. Copyright Forbids Duplicating
In addition to the Missouri court’s conclusion in the NCTQ syllabus
case and the Connecticut court’s Pictometry decision, opinions in Illinois,
Kansas, and Pennsylvania have denied requesters the ability to make
copies of public records on copyright grounds.113 In Kansas, the attorney
general—applying that state’s uncommonly explicit FOI exemption for
records that qualify for copyright protection—opined that state insurance
regulators were not obligated to provide copies of manuals filed with the
state by insurance companies explaining how they calculate their rates;
however, the opinion declined to address whether merely making the
same documents available for viewing (rather than copying) on a publicaccess terminal would qualify as infringement or be defensible as a fair
use.114
3. Copyright Permits Duplicating Only with Restrictions
Once a requester obtains a record from a government agency, the
requester ordinarily is free to adapt, redistribute, or otherwise use the
document. Indeed, attempting to dictate how a requester uses a public
record could run afoul of First Amendment prohibitions against the “prior
restraint” of speech.115 Still, several rulings have reached a split-the-baby
result that enables requesters to inspect copyright-protected records, but
to have only limited ability to duplicate or republish them.
For instance, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided agencies can
condition the ability to duplicate copyright-protected records on an

112. Lindberg, 948 P.2d at 814.
113. Garlick v. Naperville Twp., 84 N.E.3d 607, 622 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017); City of Lenexa v.
Puhr, No. 90410, 2004 WL 2160709, at *2 (Kan. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2004) (per curiam); Ali v.
Phila. City Plan. Comm’n, 125 A.3d 92, 106 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
114. Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 2010-17, 4 (July 1, 2010) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-219(a)).
115. See Ariel L. Bendor & Michal Tamir, Prior Restraint in the Digital Age, 27 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1155, 1159 (2019) (explaining the First Amendment prohibits government actors from
restraining distribution of speech, even if speech is subject to criminal or civil action).
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agreement that limits commercially redistributing the records.116 The
court decided a county could obtain copyright protection for digitally
created maps and could enforce that copyright by forbidding resale of the
maps, as long as a noncommercial requester would be able to see and
copy the maps: “The ability to copyright specially-created data, as long
as the public is given access to the public data, does not frustrate the
purpose of FOIA.”117
Attorneys general in Nevada and Texas, meanwhile, have reached a
unique resolution that enables requesters to inspect and copy records that
qualify for copyright, but with a twist: they must make the copies
themselves, to take the government agency off the hook for a potential
infringement suit by the third-party rightsholder.118 While perhaps
inventive, this decades-old accommodation does not account for the
growing number of situations in which public data is embedded within
proprietary databases, accessible only to those sitting at government
agencies’ computers and not readily amenable to self-service copying.
C. Stopping the Presses: Copyright as Obstruction to News Coverage
On occasion, wrongdoers have tried to invoke copyright to prevent or
extract damages for unfavorable news coverage. While journalists have
thus far prevailed, even tying up a news organization in court can be a
“victory,” inflicting costs and delay.
A Wisconsin schoolteacher who was fired for viewing pornography at
work attempted to suppress news reporting on the case by claiming
copyright law forbade furnishing journalists with duplicates of the
pornographic images harvested from his office computer.119 The dispute
went all the way to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which decided the
statutory exception foreclosing access to public records “to which access
is limited by copyright” did not apply, since the newspaper’s coverage
constituted a “fair use” of the images.120 In Minnesota, a weekly
116. Seago v. Horry Cnty., 663 S.E.2d 38, 46 (S.C. 2008).
117. Id. at 44. See also Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Est. Sols., 261 F.3d 179, 195 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that a statutorily guaranteed right to inspect and copy a record does not necessarily
include right to redistribute record in derogation of government agency’s copyright, and that agency
could pursue infringement remedies against a commercial reseller).
118. Copyright; Pub. Recs.; Env’t Recs., Op. Nev. Att’y Gen. No. 96-09 (Apr. 9, 1996);
Whether the R.R. Comm’n Must Provide Copies of Copyrighted Maps Requested Under the Open
Records Act, Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. MW-307 (Mar. 18, 1981). In a subsequent 1999
interpretation, the Texas attorney general reiterated that a public agency could not refuse a requester
the opportunity to review and copy digital maps on the grounds of the agency’s copyright interests,
but that the agency could impose (unspecified) “reasonable restrictions” on the use of the work
“consistent with the rights of a copyright owner . . . .” Open Recs. Decision, Op. Tex. Att’y Gen.
ORD No. 660 (Aug. 13, 1999).
119. Zellner v. Cedarburg Sch. Dist., 731 N.W.2d 240, 246 (Wis. 2007).
120. Id. at 247–48.
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newspaper prevailed in a copyright infringement lawsuit after
republishing a column from a Minneapolis police union newsletter to
accompany the newspaper’s commentary criticizing the author’s racially
offensive sentiments.121 There, too, the court concluded that the
republication qualified as a defensible “fair use.”122
As these cases illustrate, copyright can be weaponized to conceal or
minimize wrongdoing, where the plaintiff’s motive has nothing to do
with protecting creative investment in commercially valuable work.123 It
is important, then, for the law to unmistakably protect the right to obtain,
copy, and republish newsworthy documents without the chill of a costly
infringement claim.
V. THIRD-PARTY COPYRIGHT INTERESTS AND FOI
Public-records law applies not just to records created by government
agencies, but also to records acquired by government agencies in the
course of official business. For example, when a developer files a permit
application with a county zoning agency, that application becomes a
public document, even though it was created by a private party.124 Access
to documents submitted to the government by outside third parties is
critical to the public’s oversight interests. Reports mandated by state and
federal law alert the public and press when a major employer is planning
mass layoffs,125 and investors and business journalists rely on a panoply
of federally mandated reports filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission to understand the workings of publicly traded companies.126
Secret-keeping is difficult to reconcile with effective public oversight
121. Belmore v. City Pages, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 673, 680 (D. Minn. 1995).
122. Id. at 679–80.
123. See Netanel, supra note 45, at 294 (“[O]n too many occasions, copyright owners have
sought to use their proprietary entitlements blatantly to suppress political, social, or personal
criticism.”). Netanel cites Belmore and the Salinger case discussed supra Section III.A, as well as
cases brought by the Church of Scientology, Howard Hughes, and Walt Disney Productions, all
motivated to suppress public criticism rather than protect commercial value of their works. Id. at
294–95.
124. See generally Jeff Poole, New Life for Old VFW: Rezoning Public Hearing Open, DAILY
PROGRESS (Feb. 11, 2021), https://dailyprogress.com/community/orangenews/news/new-life-forold-vfw-rezoning-public-hearing-open/article_7f2878f6-6be0-11eb-b75f-6f9c83ed62dc.html
[https://perma.cc/EA72-GFEM] (using records filed with county zoning office to report on private
developer’s plans).
125. See John-Ethan Gionis, The Liquidating Fiduciary: A Hidden Exception to Warn Act
Liability, 31 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 273, 273–74 (2013) (explaining workings of so-called
WARN Acts, on the books federally and in seven states, which require large employers to give
advance notice, typically sixty days, before mass reductions in force).
126. See Chris Roush, How to Use SEC Filings to Cover Companies, JOURNALIST’S RES. (Mar.
17,
2011),
https://journalistsresource.org/tip-sheets/reporting/sec-filings-cover-companies/
[https://perma.cc/8TAJ-9GGB] (“[K]nowing how to read an SEC filing is an important tool for
anyone looking to report about companies.”).
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of government, and the daily minutiae of government agencies—how
much each employee is paid, what is being spent on office overhead, and
so on—are a matter of public record. But private industry is a different
story; with rare exceptions, nothing compels a private business to disclose
its compensation structure, business strategies, or other inner workings.
FOI law recognizes this distinction by enabling government agencies to
withhold records that would, if disclosed, compromise valuable “trade
secrets” that business entities have shared with the government, but
which could be harmful in the hands of competitors.127
Private parties, no less than government entities, have been criticized
for interpreting FOI exemptions manipulatively to insulate themselves
against public scrutiny, even if no strategically valuable information is at
risk. In an especially high-profile example, the Supreme Court sided with
the grocery industry in a dispute with a South Dakota newspaper that
attempted to use federal FOIA to obtain store-by-store readouts of the
volume of food stamps redeemed to look for patterns of fraud.128 The
resulting decision lessened the burden on businesses to qualify for the
“trade secret” exemption to federal FOIA, which open-government
advocates criticized as an invitation to concealment.129 As more and more
core governmental functions are offloaded onto private contractors, the
stakes increase for the public’s ability to see documents created and
“owned” by private entities.130
Federal copyright law has long recognized a distinction between the
protection of records created by the government versus records merely
127. See Daxton “Chip” Stewart & Amy Kristin Sanders, Secrecy, Inc.: How Governments Use
Trade Secrets, Purported Competitive Harm and Third-Party Interventions to Privatize Public
Records, 1 J. CIVIC INFO. 1, 12 (2019) (explaining that federal FOIA and “nearly all” state FOI
statutes contain an exemption enabling agencies to withhold or redact records that would give away
third parties’ economically valuable trade secrets if disclosed).
128. Food Marketing Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2360–61 (2019).
129. See Jonathan Ellis & Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Limits Access to Government Records
in Loss for Argus Leader, a USA TODAY Network Affiliate, ARGUS LEADER (June 24, 2019, 12:42
PM), https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/2019/06/24/us-supreme-court-ruling-food-stampcase-freedom-of-information-act-usda/1304385001/ [https://perma.cc/7DDT-8AF9] (quoting
critique of Supreme Court ruling as “a step backward for openness,” effectively giving businesses
a veto over public access to information about how tax dollars are spent); see also Sabrina Conza,
Chasing Smokestacks in the Dark: The Amazon HQ2 Quest Revives Debate Over Economic
Development Secrecy, 2 J. CIVIC INFO. 1, 11 (2020) (“The temptation to categorize anything about
a
private
entity’s
finances
as
a
‘trade
secret’
is
likely
only
to
worsen . . ..”); Bernard Bell, Food Marketing Institute: A Preliminary Assessment (Part I), YALE
J. ON REGUL. (July 1, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/food-marketing-institute-a-preliminaryassessment-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/V857-M5H9] (“The decision may lead lower courts to
question the long-standing interpretive principle that FOIA exemptions are to be construed
narrowly, as well as augur a change in the Supreme Court’s approach.”).
130. See Alexa Capeloto, Transparency on Trial: A Legal Review of Public Information Access
in the Face of Privatization, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 19, 20–21 (2013) (discussing the overlooked
effect of privatization on the guaranteed right of the public’s access to information).
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acquired by the government. In the latter instance, copyright protection
can still adhere, even when a document passes into federal custody.131
But even concluding that copyright is not forfeited when a document is
provided to a government agency does not answer the FOI question: does
a document’s copyright status override the public’s statutory entitlement
to inspect and copy it?
The question is being put to the test in an ongoing dispute in Utah over
the operating standards for county jails. In May 2018, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the nonprofit Disability Law Center filed
suit under Utah’s Government Records Management Act (GRMA),
seeking access to inspection reports of the Davis County Jail in Salt Lake
City, as well as the uniform statewide standards by which conditions are
assessed.132 The county, asserting the ownership interests of the private
vendor who sells the proprietary standards, contends that the records are
protected against disclosure by copyright law.133 In a narrow ruling that
did not reach the copyright question, a state adjudicatory board decided
that the Utah Jail Standards, written for the Utah Sheriffs’ Association by
a private contractor, do not meet the threshold statutory definition of
records that Davis County is obligated to surrender, because they are not
the county’s documents.134 The State Records Committee thus did not
squarely confront the copyright status of the documents. But copyright
emerged as the potentially decisive issue on appeal. When challenging
the Records Committee’s decision in court, the county asserted the
vendor’s copyright interests as a justification for withholding access to
the jail standards.135 Nearly three years after the initial public-records
request, the requesters finally prevailed when a state trial court rejected
the copyright argument and ordered the documents released.136 The court
concluded that the GRMA contemplated release of copyright-protected
131. See Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 155 (2013) (observing that federal agencies can be held liable for failing
to protect interests of third-party copyright holders when relying on private industry standardsetting bodies, which may motivate agencies to merely incorporate industry standards by reference
rather than reproducing them); but see St. Paul’s Benevolent Educ. & Missionary Inst. v. United
States, 506 F. Supp. 822, 829–30 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (refusing to block production under FOIA of
third-party documents in Federal Centers for Disease Control’s custody, even though creator
claimed copyright interest, because FOIA does not explicitly exempt copyrighted materials).
132. Mark Shenefelt, Copyright Questions Sidetrack Effort to Open Utah’s Secret Jail
Standards, STANDARD-EXAM’R (Nov. 24, 2019), https://www.standard.net/police-fire/copyrightquestions-sidetrack-effort-to-open-utah-s-secret-jail/article_ca9c0e0c-d005-5dc3-a8eb503eec1af1cc.html [https://perma.cc/L2D8-MTTN].
133. Id.
134. ACLU of Utah v. Davis Cnty., No. 18-15 (State Recs. Comm. Utah, Apr. 23, 2018),
https://archives.utah.gov/src/srcappeal-2018-15.html [https://perma.cc/P2GD-8CM9].
135. Shenefelt, supra note 132.
136. ACLU of Utah v. Davis Cnty., No. 180700511, 2021 WL 1215891, at *13–14 (Utah Dist.
Ct. Mar. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Davis Cnty.].
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material when consistent with the copyright doctrine of fair use, and
found that the requesters’ planned use of the materials for nonprofit
educational purposes qualified as a fair use.137 Significantly, however, a
factor in the court’s assessment was that the requested standards were
already becoming outdated by the vendor’s continual updates, so that
release of the soon-to-be-outdated standards would not interfere with the
marketability of succeeding versions.138 This is foreboding for public
access to other government-held documents that do not as readily lose
their potential market value with the passage of time.
The mischief that could result from recognizing third-party copyright
interests as a barrier to disclosure of records held and used by government
agencies is self-evident in the Utah jail case. The welfare of people held
in county jails is a core public concern. It would frustrate the purpose of
FOI law if government entities could evade public oversight of essential
health and safety functions simply by purchasing their regulations from
private vendors and then invoking copyright when questioned. But the
Davis County jail case is by no means isolated. The public’s ability to see
and copy standards set by professional associations has often brought
transparency concerns into tension with private contractors’ proprietary
interests.
Government agencies regularly rely on private standard-setting bodies
from specialized fields to establish the expectations for those fields,
incorporating privately created standards into statutes and regulations. At
times, these rules are downloaded wholesale into statutes or regulations,
where they are fully visible, but at other times, they are merely
incorporated by reference, leaving anyone who needs access to seek the
text from its private authors.139
Whether the public is entitled to inspect, copy, and redistribute
privately developed standards is an especially contentious strain of
“copyright versus FOI” jurisprudence.140 In one prominent case, a closely
split Fifth Circuit determined that a private vendor of model building
codes could not assert copyright to constrain the redistribution of those
137. Id. at *6, *10; see also Paighten Harkins, Years After a Spate of Questionable Utah InCustody Deaths, Utah Jail Operating Standards Are Now Public Records, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Apr.
2,
2021,
5:06
PM),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2021/04/02/years-after-spate/
[https://perma.cc/WN3U-CDU8].
138. Davis Cnty., 2021 WL 1215891, at *9–10.
139. See Bremer, supra note 131, at 136 (“The greatest challenge of incorporation by reference
is that it can erect a barrier impeding access to the law, sometimes even requiring one to pay a
private party to see the full text of a final or proposed regulation.”).
140. See Jessica C. Tones, Copyright Monopoly vs. Public Access—Why the Law Should Not
Be in Private Hands, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 371, 378 (2005) (observing that courts generally have
declined to extend the principle that “law” cannot be copyright protected to also include model
codes developed by private authors).
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model codes once they became incorporated into municipal
ordinances.141 The case, Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International, was brought by a nonprofit professional association that
offered its model codes at no cost to local governments and encouraged
their adoption, earning money by selling copies of the code to private
entities.142 A Texas blogger purchased the association’s model code and
posted the salient portions online, correctly identified not as a model
construction code but as the actual code enacted by two local towns, and
the association sued for copyright infringement.143
The en banc Fifth Circuit majority decided that, once the privately
drafted Standard Building Code took on legally binding force, the codes
became free to republish because their contents were then non-copyrightprotected “facts.” In other words, it was a fact that the City of Savoy,
Texas, enforced certain requirements for the soundness of construction,
and listing those requirements amounted to nothing more than a recitation
of facts.144 The publisher accused of infringement could not, the majority
wrote, express these “facts” in any other way; to do so would misstate
what local regulations require and mislead the reader.145
Other courts have been more receptive to the copyright arguments of
standard-setting entities. Their decisions sometimes turn on the nature of
the relationship—or lack of one—between the government agency and
the professional organization. If a government body simply refers to a
preexisting set of externally developed standards, as opposed to actually
importing their text into a regulation or hiring the outside entity to
develop the standards, then it is less likely that others will be entitled to
copy and use the standards.146
Of course, it is not necessary to conclude that copyright is waived or
forfeited for a document to qualify as a public record. When an
engineering firm files a drawing of a proposed skyscraper with a county
zoning board for purposes of securing a permit, the public indisputably
has a right to inspect the drawing—but the engineering firm still retains
141. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 806 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
142. Id. at 793–94.
143. Id. at 793.
144. Id. at 801.
145. Id. at 802.
146. See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reps., Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73–74 (2d Cir.
1994) (finding state’s act of incorporating automobile valuation manual into insurance statutes did
not place manual into public domain where a competitor could duplicate and commercially exploit
it); see also Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1997),
amended by 133 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding AMA coding system for medical procedures
remained eligible for copyright protection even after being incorporated by reference into federal
Medicare and Medicaid regulations, so that publishing company was not free to re-sell the codes
commercially).
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the bundle of rights associated with copyright, including the right to sell
the drawing, to exhibit or display it, or to create works derivative from
it.147
If the government acts as the enforcer of privately developed standards
that are inaccessible on the basis of copyright, regulated entities could be
subject to legally enforceable requirements that they cannot freely see.
This would seem to run afoul—in spirit, if not in letter—of the Supreme
Court’s well-established jurisprudence that legally binding standards
cannot be copyright protected, because those expected to conform to
them must be given fair notice.148 As Professor Pamela Samuelson has
observed, requiring regulated entities to pay a royalty premium to see the
government-enforced standards they are expected to obey would have
“perverse incentives . . . making public employees into a kind of free
sales force” for the standard-setting organizations.149
One reason that courts have been willing to indulge copyright as an
impediment to FOI requests for privatized standards is that the standards
usually are accessible to some extent, including to the entities that must
comply with them. For instance, in Practice Management, the Ninth
Circuit observed that anyone who needed to use the AMA’s proprietary
set of medical terminology could get access to the work, so the case was
not about withholding information from the public, but simply preventing
an interloper from re-selling it.150 This decisive fact distinguishes the
“industry standard” cases from the far more worrisome scenario in which
an agency might invoke copyright to keep government secrets from ever
being seen.
Even the relatively pro-disclosure outcome in the Fifth Circuit’s Veeck
case, involving model building codes, arguably provides insufficient
public access for this reason: if the public must wait until standards are
enacted into law to see them, then the public cannot fully participate in
the enactment process. One of the core purposes of freedom-ofinformation law is to enable citizens to provide informed input into

147. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating creator’s rights in copyright-protected works).
148. See Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888) (holding that court opinions are not
works of “authorship” for copyright purposes, because they are created by judicial officers in the
course of their public duties, and interests of justice require that the public has access to statutes
and authoritative interpretations of those statutes); see also Shellea Diane Crochet, Comment,
Official Code, Locked Down: An Analysis of Copyright as It Applies to Annotations of State Official
Codes, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 131, 152 (2016) (“As a black letter rule, the law itself is in the public
domain and is not protected under copyright.” (internal quotations omitted)).
149. Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 193, 223
(2007).
150. See Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp., 121 F.3d at 519 (concluding that recognizing creator’s
copyright posed no realistic threat to public access to the standards).
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policymaking.151 A person attending a city council meeting where new
construction regulations are under consideration should be entitled,
copyright notwithstanding, to review the proposed regulations in
advance. A contrary rule would give industries a prohibitive “write your
own regulations” advantage in working with policymakers behind the
backs of the citizens who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the
regulations.152
VI. THE JURISDICTIONAL PUZZLE
When a public-records dispute requires construing federal copyright
law, where is the proper place to litigate the case? The scope of federal
jurisdiction over copyright cases has been called “among the knottiest
problems in copyright jurisprudence.”153 A dispute over records sought
from a Florida property tax agency illustrates how difficult it can be to
find a court appropriate to adjudicate all issues in a case implicating both
federal copyright law and state open-records law.
In Microdecisions v. Skinner, a requester sued a county property
appraiser who refused to provide copies of maps that qualified as public
records under Florida law.154 The requester initiated the case in state
court, but the judge concluded the copyright issue belonged in federal
court.155 The case was removed to federal court, but the district court
judge remanded it to state court, concluding the case was based on rights
arising under state law.156 A state appeals court ultimately agreed the case
belonged in state court, but on the merits, it decided there really was no
copyright issue, because state law did not authorize the county to obtain
a copyright for the maps.157
It is widely accepted that, when a case otherwise properly before a state
court requires construing copyright law, state courts do have competency
to decide the issue. Although Congress has vested the U.S. district courts
with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate cases “arising under” the
151. See Angela M. Evans & Adriana Campos, Open Government Initiatives: Challenges of
Citizen Participation, 32 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 172, 173 (2013) (“[T]he primary goal of
open government . . . is to ensure that the American public has access to objective, relevant, and
reliable information to help them arrive at informed judgments about issues and the government’s
role in tackling these problems.”).
152. See Bremer, supra note 131, at 153–54 (calling it “intolerable” that citizens interested in a
rulemaking process might have to go to an agency reading room to review the standards that a
government body is planning to adopt and concluding that agencies that incorporate such material
by reference should make it available electronically).
153. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 3
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.01[A] at 12–4 (1999)).
154. Microdecisions, Inc. v. Skinner, 889 So. 2d 871, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 874.
157. Id. at 876.
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Copyright Act,158 federal courts have taken a relatively narrow view of
what it means for a dispute to arise under copyright law. In particular,
breach of contract disputes involving the royalties from copyrightprotected work are regularly adjudicated in state court, even if copyright
ownership is the central issue.159 As Judge Friendly explained in a muchcited 1964 decision, the dispositive question is whether the dispute
requires actually interpreting the Copyright Act; if so, then it is a case
“arising under” the act for purposes of federal jurisdiction.160
Even if a state court can rule on the copyright status of a disputed
record, there is obvious potential for conflict and confusion. What force
does a state court’s declaration of the rights of the parties in a publicrecords dispute carry, if the copyright status of the record is subsequently
disputed in federal court? Using the college syllabus case for illustrative
purposes, suppose that a public university obtains a judgment in state
court that a syllabus need not be surrendered to an FOI requester, because
the syllabus is the copyright-protected property of the university. Would
that state-court ruling preclude the professor who created the syllabus
from later contesting the university’s copyright ownership in a federal
proceeding? Would the state-court ruling settle the ownership of the
document, so the professor would lack standing to bring an infringement
action in federal court if a third party commercially exploits the
syllabus?161 To extend the hypothetical further, could a New York
publishing company rely on a Minnesota state court’s ruling that a
syllabus is not protected by copyright so as to begin duplicating and
reselling the syllabus, or would the publisher be at risk of an infringement
claim in a New York federal court? Putting state courts in the business of
adjudicating copyright disputes risks creating a fragmented body of
irreconcilable interpretations of the Copyright Act of uncertain
precedential value.162 And because the underlying claim will have arisen
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
159. See, e.g., Durgom v. Janowiak, 74 Cal. App. 4th 178, 183, 186–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding state court has jurisdiction to decide dispute over unpaid royalties from copyrighted song);
Olcott Int’l & Co., Inc. v. Micro Data Base Sys., No. IP99-1780-C-B/S, 2000 WL 892874, at *4–
5 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 2000) (concluding that state court can resolve validity of disputed copyright
when claim is intertwined with state-law contract claim).
160. T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964); see also Outcault v. Lamar,
119 N.Y.S. 930, 931 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909) (“[U]nless it appears [from the complaint] that the
plaintiff seeks to enforce a right based upon the copyright laws of the United States, the federal
court would have no jurisdiction . . . .”).
161. See Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2013) (observing that only
the owner of a work has standing to sue for copyright infringement (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(b))).
162. See Ali v. Phila. City Plan. Comm’n, 125 A.3d 92, 104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (observing
that a state court’s ruling that making copies of a public record constitutes a fair use “would not
preclude a copyright owner from pursuing an infringement lawsuit in federal court, and the district
court would not be bound by [the state court’s] ‘fair-use’ decision”).
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under state FOI law, the Supreme Court will be in no position to reconcile
state courts’ potentially contradictory interpretations.163 For this reason,
at least one state court adjudicating a public-records case has concluded
that state courts do not have jurisdiction to decide whether the act of
furnishing a requester with a copy of a public record qualifies under the
Copyright Act as a fair use.164
Something close to this “jurisdictional death spiral nightmare”
occurred in the Illinois case of Garlick v. Naperville Township.165 There,
a requester seeking access to the county property tax office’s entire
database of parcels was denied access to the database in its native form,
because the county argued production would violate the copyright of the
vendor that furnished the software in which the data was stored.166 The
requester sued in state court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
records were subject to production, and after losing at the trial court, took
the case to the Court of Appeals.167 The appellate court found that the
requester’s challenge was, functionally, a challenge to the validity of the
software company’s copyright, and that a state court was “not the proper
forum in which to challenge a copyright claim.”168 Without passing on
the merits of the copyrightability of the software, the court upheld the
decision that production could be denied.169
As the Garlick cases exemplifies, as long as copyright is understood to
present an impediment to FOI access, resolving a dispute may require
parallel state and federal proceedings. The Illinois statutory exemption at
issue provides that records can be withheld both from inspection and
copying if they are “specifically prohibited from disclosure” by federal
law.170 For a state court to determine whether the FOI exemption extends
to a record on the grounds of copyright requires resolving, potentially,
163. Federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over, principally, claims “arising under” federal
law, meaning federal law creates the right being asserted. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257
(2013). As the Gunn Court explained, a narrow (and somewhat ill-defined) second category of
cases may be adjudicated in federal court “if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually
disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the
federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Id. at 258. However, in the Gunn case itself, the Court
declined to find that a state-law legal malpractice claim was subject to federal jurisdiction, even
though the case required applying federal patent law to decide whether the malpractice defendant
had mishandled a patent case. Id.
164. See Ali, 125 A.3d at 104–05 (stating that, because a state court lacks jurisdiction to decide
whether disclosure of copyrighted material constitutes infringement, the only question a state court
can answer in the context of an FOIA case is whether the case presents a copyright infringement
issue, at which point the issue must be resolved in federal court).
165. Garlick v. Naperville Twp., 84 N.E.3d 607, 622 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
166. Id. at 611–12.
167. Id. at 616–17.
168. Id. at 621.
169. Id. at 622.
170. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 140/7(1)(a) (2016).
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two different federal copyright issues: first, whether the record even
qualifies for copyright protection at all (the issue raised but not addressed
in Garlick), and second, whether the record’s copyright status actually
prohibits inspection or copying. The latter decision may implicate fair
use, an analysis state courts struggle with.
The NCTQ cases from Missouri and Minnesota illustrate starkly how
state-court judges unaccustomed to applying copyright law can mangle
the fair-use determination. Although the sister appellate courts reached
different outcomes about the accessibility of the syllabi requested in those
cases, they agreed on one principle: that the question of whether a state
agency may lawfully furnish a copy of a copyright-protected document
to a third-party requester requires considering what the requester plans to
do with the document. This is a fundamental misunderstanding of how
copyright works. If a rightsholder (in these cases, the professors who
wrote the syllabi) were aggrieved by the way that the NCTQ used the
document, its remedy would be against the NCTQ.
Imagine that the state agency is a bookstore, and the bookstore sells a
copy of a bestseller to a purchaser who intends to make photocopies of
the book and sell them at prices undercutting the publisher. The
publisher’s recourse would be against the pirate competitor and not
against the bookstore. In other words, assuming copyright law applies at
all, the transaction in the NCTQ cases that required analysis was the
transaction in which the university fulfills its state-mandated legal duty
by furnishing a single copy of a syllabus to the NCTQ at nominal charge.
What the NCTQ ultimately planned to do with the syllabi was a different
transaction from the initial fulfillment of the FOI request, and that
transaction would be analyzed separately under copyright law, if and
when the owners sought to enforce their rights. It seems unlikely that a
federal court experienced in adjudicating copyright claims could have
made such a fundamental analytical mistake.171
Because public-records disputes do not belong in federal court, and
copyright disputes do not belong in state court, it is essential to
disentangle the two bodies of law. The current understanding of the law
leaves two comparably distasteful options: either state courts adjudicate
complex copyright issues beyond their primary realm of expertise,
producing results that may not carry any force in federal court, or the
parties to a dispute split their claims and pursue parallel state and federal
171. The Washington Supreme Court made the same analytical error in Lindberg v. Cnty. of
Kitsap, 948 P.2d 805, 814 (Wash. 1997) (en banc), basing a county’s obligation to provide access
to and copies of records on the requester’s intended use of the records. Because a county cannot
control how citizens use government records—and, indeed, cannot demand to know what they plan
to do with them—the proper analysis is to treat the government agency’s production and the
recipient’s use of the documents as two legally distinct transactions.
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actions, exhausting the resources of all but the most determined FOI
requesters.
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Official government memos are unlike J.D. Salinger’s letters.
Government records memorialize how decisions of great public
consequence are reached by people hired and paid to do the public’s
business.172 Government agencies’ insistence that otherwise-public
records can be withheld on the grounds of copyright protection imperils
effective oversight of, and participation in, state and local civic affairs.173
It is not fanciful to fear that government agencies armed with a
“copyright exemption” will use the exemption in bad faith to withhold
records even where the true motive is concealing scandal, not protecting
any purported creative investment in the work. Even where there is no
concealment motive, cash-strapped government agencies or profitmotivated individuals might seek to use copyright law to extract licensing
fees for documents that, by all rights, should be accessible as public
records.174 As one judge colorfully observed in dissenting from the view
that a requester could be required to pay a $2,000 premium to obtain
county tax data because the data was stored within copyright-protected
third-party software:
A person seeking public records should expect to pay the price
for copying the records, but not the price for a public entity’s
mistake in purchasing inefficient software. . . . The holding in this
172. See Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep’t of Consumer & Indus. Servs., 631 N.W.2d 769, 772
(Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (“By mandating the disclosure of information relating to the affairs of
government and the official acts of public officials and employees, the FOIA facilitates the public’s
understanding of the operations and activities of government.”).
173. See Eric E. Johnson, The Misadventure of Copyrighting State Law, 107 KY. L.J. 593, 627
(2018) (“[I]f you put something [in this case, statutory compilations] behind a paywall, you are
going to stifle productive thinking about it. And that is going to decrease debate and democratic
participation.”).
174. In an enlightening example outside the public records realm, the heirs of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., have secured copyright protection for his classic speeches, including the iconic 1963 “I
Have a Dream” address in Washington, D.C., so that the speech may not be republished in whole
or in substantial portion without payment. Valerie Strauss, 53 Years Later, You Still Have to Pay
to Use Martin Luther King Jr.’s Famous ‘I Have a Dream’ Speech, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2017/01/15/54-years-later-you-stillhave-to-pay-to-use-martin-luther-king-jr-s-famous-i-have-a-dream-speech/
[https://perma.cc/HP82-6YYQ]. One could readily imagine a state governor who dislikes media
criticism insisting that every gubernatorial speech is a copyright-protected work of creativity that
news organizations may not republish without payment. Further, at least some states have taken the
position that unenacted legislation may be protected by copyright. See Dmitrieva, supra note 82, at
101 (noting that states posting legislation to websites have statutorily disclaimed any
relinquishment of copyright in doing so). If that claim were enforced, a citizen who wished to obtain
a proposed bill for purposes of formulating comments to elected officials, or redistribute copies of
the bill to allies, might face a prohibitive “paywall” barrier.
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case encourages public entities desiring secrecy to hide public
records within a software lockbox and require individual citizens
to provide the golden key to unlock it.175
Simply put, public access to documents reflecting the operations of
state and local governments is too essential to be left vulnerable to claims,
as in the Missouri syllabus case, that the government’s copyright
overrides the public’s right to know.
There is every reason to be concerned that, with Pictometry as a
precedent, copyright law will be used more aggressively in the future to
withhold access to entire categories of documents that have long been
publicly accessible. For instance, one legal scholar has suggested
asserting copyright protection over jail mugshots, which news
organizations routinely use in their coverage, as a way of denying copies
of booking photos to exploitative websites that republish embarrassing
photos for profit.176 Should such an approach take hold, government
agencies would be empowered to invoke copyright to reject requests for
documents on the grounds that they disapprove of how the requester
intends to use them. Plainly, such power could be abused to frustrate
journalists’ watchdog reporting.
A. Copyright and FOI: A Marriage That Can’t Be Saved?
In concept, copyright and FOI law should be able to cohabit
harmoniously. Access to information is recognized as an essential
prerequisite for citizens in a democratic society to participate effectively
in self-governance and to keep watch for abuse of power by their elected
officials.177 Copyright law is intended primarily to promote the
dissemination of knowledge for the benefit of the public.178 The
objectives of the two bodies of law might seem well aligned. But their
routes to achieve those objectives head in opposite directions.
Copyright law is understood as necessary to create an incentive for
creators to invest time and talent in writing novels and composing

175. State ex rel. Gambill v. Opperman, 986 N.E.2d 931, 939 (Ohio 2013) (Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting).
176. Jason Tashea, Use Copyright Law to Battle Mugshot Extortion, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 27,
2018, 9:23 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/use_copyright_law_to_battle_
against_mugshot_extortion [https://perma.cc/VB5S-XYFH].
177. See Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the
Government’s Power to Control Public Access Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 91, 97 (2003) (“[T]he concept of the public domain helps to establish a legal restraint
against government overreaching by ensuring the public’s access to materials that are essential for
self-governance and a learned citizenry.”).
178. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (rejecting argument that Copyright Act was
intended to provide incentives only for creation of works and stating that copyright exists to
promote dissemination, not just creation).
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songs.179 But government agencies and their employees do not ordinarily
need any added incentive, beyond their publicly supplied funding, to
write memos, draw maps, or compile databases.180 Certainly, they do not
need several lifetimes’ worth of incentives.
Federal copyright protection extends for the author’s lifetime plus
seventy years or, in the case of a “work made for hire,” ninety-five years
from its first publication or 120 years from the time of creation,
whichever elapses first.181 This duration guarantees that no one who
makes a request for public records and is denied on the basis of copyright
will live to see the records become accessible. The longevity of copyright
protection sharply contrasts with the far more limited protection afforded
to even the most fiercely protected federal records. The Presidential
Records Act makes White House papers presumptively available for
inspection five years after the president’s term ends, with the possibility
of an additional seven-year extension for especially sensitive
documents.182 Even classified national security documents are
presumptively accessible to the public within ten years of the initial
classification decision, which the custodian agency can extend to no more
than twenty-five years.183 Plainly, it makes no sense to say that a White
House memo implicating matters of national security can harmlessly be
released to the public after twenty-five years, while a college professor’s
syllabus needs to be locked away for 100 years. Government agencies
themselves do not routinely handle documents in the way that valuable
pieces of copyright-protected property would be handled. Every state
maintains a “records retention” regime under which documents typically
become eligible for disposal within several years (or sometimes even
days) after creation,184 indicating that agencies do not treat their records
as marketable intellectual property with a century’s worth of value.
179. See Elissa D. Hecker, Comment: Understand and Respect the Copyright Law: Keep the
Incentive to Create, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 741, 741–42 (2003) (explaining the incentives in
U.S. copyright law).
180. See Petersen, supra note 5, at 463 (“[O]ne must seriously question the need to offer
copyright protection for government-created works.”). This observation was made in the context
of government employees’ compensation to produce work to benefit the general welfare; courts
have long made the same point regarding opinions written by publicly salaried judges. See
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking and the Case
of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 295 (2005) (“[J]udges need no incentives to generate written
legal opinions because this production function is an essential component of their work assignment
. . . .”).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
182. 44 U.S.C. § 2204.
183. Exec. Order No. 13526, 3 C.F.R. EO13526, § 1.5 (2010).
184. See Daxton R. Stewart, Killer Apps: Vanishing Messages, Encrypted Communications,
and Challenges to Freedom of Information Laws When Public Officials “Go Dark”, 10 CASE W.
RES. J. L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 16 (2019) (describing varying range of state-records retention
practices, which can include routine deletion of emails after as little as five days).
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Simply put, while copyright normally is understood to encourage the
dissemination of information and ideas,185 a copyright exemption to FOI
law impedes the dissemination of information and ideas.186 When a
government agency invokes an FOI exemption, it is almost never because
the agency intends to share the records; it is because the agency wants no
one to see them.187
Copyright and FOI law cannot easily coexist for another reason:
freedom-of-information law is built to provide relatively speedy
disposition of time-sensitive cases and to allow successful requesters
thwarted by government foot-dragging to recoup their legal fees.188
Copyright law is not.
To illustrate, consider the case of a frustrated records requester in
Wisconsin, dragged into federal court on what the court ultimately
concluded was a meritless copyright claim.189 WIREdata, Inc., which
furnishes data to real estate sales agents, asked several Wisconsin
municipalities to produce data showing the assessed value of residential
properties. But the municipalities refused, citing the risk of copyright
liability to Assessment Technologies (AT), from whom they licensed
their software.190 WIREdata sued the custodians in state court under the
Wisconsin Open Records Statute, and AT responded by suing WIREdata
in federal court, alleging copyright infringement.191 The Seventh Circuit
held in favor of WIREdata and concluded that the request did not
compromise any of AT’s copyright-protected interests, because the
request sought only the underlying assessment data, not the software
itself.192 Writing for the court, Judge Richard Posner called the software
vendor’s attempt to monopolize access to government data “appalling,”
speculating that AT’s real motive was to extract a licensing fee from
185. See Adrian Liu, Copyright as Quasi-Public Property: Reinterpreting the Conflict Between
Copyright and the First Amendment, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 383, 415–16
(2008) (“By enacting copyright law, the government grants exclusive rights to authors in order to
increase the number of works available to the public.”).
186. See Crochet, supra note 148, at 151 (“When protection is given to the state for its annotated
code, innovative and novel approaches to the law are arguably hindered in the courtroom.”).
187. See Liu, supra note 185, at 419 (observing that copyright law accommodates First
Amendment concerns by enabling members of the public to “borrow the ideas contained in the
copyrighted work,” which would not happen if government agencies use an exemption to withhold
access).
188. See Jessica L. Farley, Note, Wisconsin Open Records Law After WIREdata: Still Viable to
Protect Public Access to Information?, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1189, 1196–97 (2010) (explaining that,
under Wisconsin law, requesters can file a petition for mandamus to compel uncooperative agencies
to release records or enlist the local district attorney to bring an enforcement action, and that
successful requesters presumptively are entitled to recoup attorney’s fees).
189. Assessment Techs. of WI, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2003).
190. Id. at 642.
191. Id. at 641–42.
192. Id. at 645.
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WIREdata for using its software.193
Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that, while
WIREdata was entitled to receive the property valuation data, it was
sufficient for the agencies to provide copies in PDF document form rather
than, as WIREdata sought, in the proprietary electronic database format
in which the data was stored.194 Because of the multiplicious legal
proceedings, it took more than seven years to resolve WIREdata’s
request.195 Plainly, copyright disputes can prolong requests for public
records to the point where the records become irrelevant, unaffordable,
and practically worthless.196 While WIREdata was the rare requester with
the money and determination to litigate for eight years, few civic
organizations or journalists will be willing or able to do so,197 which
means copyright can become a backdoor means of denial.
B. The (Incomplete) Fair-Use Workaround
It has been argued that, even if records produced in the course of
government business are recognized as copyright protected, the fair-use
doctrine could legitimize providing access to those documents for
societally valuable purposes, such as academic research or news
reporting.198 News reporting and commentary are statutorily recognized
categories entitled to some degree of leeway in applying the fair-use
defense.199 However, the protection is not absolute, and it is still possible
for the journalistic republication of protected work to constitute

193. Id. at 642, 645.
194. WIREdata, Inc. v. Vill. of Sussex, 751 N.W.2d 736, 762–63 (Wis. 2008).
195. See id. at 746–47 (recounting timeline of litigation from its 2001 origin).
196. See Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart & Charles N. Davis, Bringing Full Disclosure Back: A Call
for Dismantling FOIA, 21 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 515, 535 (2016) (“[W]hen it comes to government
transparency, often access delayed is access denied.”).
197. See Jonathan Peters, Survey: Editors See Media Losing Ground as Legal Advocate for 1st
Amendment,
COLUM.
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Apr.
21,
2016),
https://www.cjr.org/united_states_project/knight_survey_editors_first_amendment.php
[https://perma.cc/6YHF-5LTX] (“[E]conomic trends have put pressure on the capacity of news
organizations to litigate and otherwise to take stands to advance free speech and press rights.”).
198. See, e.g., Nat’l Council on Tchr. Quality v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 837 N.W.2d 314,
318–19 (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (applying fair use to permit copying of university documents for
purposes of research and critique). See also Renee G. Rabinowitz, Applicability of the Freedom of
Information Act’s Disclosure Requirements to Intellectual Property, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 561,
573–74 (1982) (“[T]he ‘fair use’ doctrine, developed as a defense to copyright infringement claims,
appears to provide an appropriate standard for reaching an equitable result in . . . disputes over
copyrighted materials [in the context of federal FOIA law].”).
199. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
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actionable infringement,200 as the Supreme Court held in a 1985 case
against The Nation magazine.201 In that case, the Court declined to find
that the unauthorized republication of a portion of former President
Gerald Ford’s not-yet-published autobiography was a fair use, even
though the passage shed light on the biggest national news story of 1974:
the resignation of President Richard Nixon and his subsequent pardon.202
Fair use is an intensely fact-specific inquiry, and it generally arises as a
defense only after a court reaches the threshold decision that an
infringement took place. A journalist or researcher cannot be expected to
go through an intense judicial fact-finding exercise every time a
government record is needed.
The signature fair-use case of New Era Publications International v.
Henry Holt & Co., involving an unauthorized biography of Scientology
founder L. Ron Hubbard, illustrates how copyright can chill reporting on
matters of public controversy.203 In New Era, the rightsholder to the late
Hubbard’s writings sought to enjoin publication of the unflattering book,
claiming the author quoted excessively from Hubbard’s unpublished
letters, which the author maintained were necessary to illustrate
Hubbard’s character flaws. The federal Second Circuit found that the
balance of fair-use factors tilted in favor of the Hubbard estate, as the
biographer’s excerpts were more than what was needed to convey his
point.204 The court declined on equitable grounds to issue the requested
injunction, believing that the rightsholder had needlessly delayed
asserting its rights, but left open the opportunity to recover infringement
damages.205 Nevertheless, the court recognized that even a small amount
of unauthorized borrowing from unpublished correspondence is normally
grounds for an injunction.206 That conclusion—from the court that
adjudicates disputes at the epicenter of the nation’s book and news
publishing industries—could be an extraordinarily chilling one for
reporting on the contents of unpublished government documents. 207
Ordinarily, it is nearly impossible to enjoin the publication of news, as
200. See Lukes, supra note 67, at 849 (“The Supreme Court has held that just because a use
falls into a category outlined in the statute does not make it a per se fair use.”).
201. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 539–40 (1985).
202. Id. at 568–69.
203. New Era Publ’ns Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Inc., 873 F.2d 576, 580–81 (2d Cir.
1989).
204. Id. at 583–84.
205. Id. at 584–85.
206. Id. at 584.
207. See Hall, supra note 66, at 248–50 (observing that New Era and other unfavorable fair-use
decisions encourage plaintiffs to copyright important materials they wish to conceal and that
unpublished writings can be important in understanding the thought process of influential public
figures).
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courts ardently disfavor “prior restraints” of speech on First Amendment
grounds.208 If reprinting large excerpts from previously unpublished state
government documents becomes recognized as grounds for an injunction
against publication, then copyright law is on a headlong collision course
with nearly a century’s worth of First Amendment doctrine.209
The NCTQ Missouri court pinpointed precisely why fair use, in the
court’s vivid phrasing, “does not work” in the context of FOI law.210 Fair
use is backward looking, analyzing how the republisher used the creator’s
work.211 But there will be no republication unless the government agency
allows inspection and duplication of the document. So, the argument
quickly becomes circular: the agency will not release the copy unless it
is convinced that the republication will be “fair,” and the republisher
cannot demonstrate “fairness” without access to the copy.
Take the dispute that arose between the University of Iowa and a
documentary filmmaker over footage of a disastrous 2008 flood that was
filmed by a university employee.212 The university insisted that the
footage was copyright-protected state property, and that copyright
overrode the filmmaker’s right of access under the Iowa Open Records
Act.213 The university’s refusal to surrender the footage foreclosed any
attempt at fair use. Ultimately, the filmmaker dismissed his complaint
against the university and settled the dispute, so the case did nothing to
clarify the state of the law.214 However, the disagreement made vividly
208. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 718 (1931) (“The fact that for
approximately one hundred and fifty years there has been almost an entire absence of attempts to
impose previous restraints upon publications relating to the malfeasance of public officers is
significant of the deep-seated conviction that such restraints would violate constitutional right.”);
see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (concluding
that government did not meet heavy burden of justifying judicial remedy of prior restraint in dispute
over newspaper’s intended publication of leaked national security documents).
209. See Tiffany D. Trunko, Note, Remedies for Copyright Infringement: Respecting the First
Amendment, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1940, 1940–41 (1989) (“When a copyright holder sues to prevent
publication of a book or article, injunctive relief may look suspiciously like a prior restraint,
potentially violating the defendant’s first amendment freedoms.”); see also id. at 1956 (“[C]ourts
tend to grant injunctive relief as a matter of course [in copyright infringement cases].”).
210. Nat’l Council [on] Tchr. Quality, Inc. v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 446 S.W.3d 723, 730
(Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
211. See Coll. Entrance Examination Bd. v. Pataki, 889 F. Supp. 554, 565 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
(noting that, as an affirmative defense, fair use does not arise until the copyright owner first
establishes a prima facie case of infringement).
212. Erin Jordan, University of Iowa Broke Public Records Law, State Board Staff Say, THE
(CEDAR RAPIDS) GAZETTE (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:07 PM), https://www.thegazette.com/highereducation/university-of-iowa-broke-public-records-law-state-board-staff-say/
[https://perma.cc/HAG4-R4QH].
213. Id.
214. Erin Jordan, Filmmaker, UI Settle Over Flood Photos and Video, THE (CEDAR RAPIDS)
GAZETTE (May 16, 2017, 5:19 PM), https://www.thegazette.com/government-politics/filmmakerui-settle-over-flood-photos-and-video/ [https://perma.cc/3QGA-CMXF].
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real the concern that agencies can invoke copyright to foreclose any
attempt at making a fair use of government-created work, even for a
statutorily recognized fair-use purpose such as journalism or
commentary.215
There is a strong argument that, when a government agency responds
to an FOI request, and again when a news organization quotes or
republishes the document, the document has been “recontextualized” so
as to make its use fair.216 Take the hypothetical case of a memo that a city
manager (“Abel”) circulates to members of the city council analyzing the
job performance of the city’s police chief (“Baker”). The original purpose
of the document is to convey Abel’s assessment of how Baker is
performing. But when the document is produced to a journalist in
response to an FOI request, the purpose of the document is transformed;
the purpose is to say, “This is the public record, meeting the description
of your request, that was distributed to the city council.” (One might
analogize to the evidentiary principle that a document is not hearsay if it
is offered into evidence for reasons other than for the truth of the matter
asserted.217) When a journalist republishes some or all of the record, the
republication likewise recontextualizes the document; the news report
does not exist for the purpose of notifying the city council what the city
manager thinks of the police chief, but to notify the public of the
information that has been communicated to the city council.
Relying on fair use, however, is an inadequate assurance of public
access. The critical issue is whether a government agency will turn over
a copy of a document or database when required to do so under state FOI
law. Fair use depends on the manner in which the work is reused.218 But
FOI law generally does not entitle an agency to ask how the requester
intends to use the document, or to condition access on a promise to use
the document for limited purposes.219 Indeed, most news organizations
215. See Walter G. Lehmann, Wake of the Flood: Public Records, Copyright and Fair Use in
Documentary Film, LANDSLIDE, July 2017, at 24, 28—27 (explaining that documentary
filmmakers rely on the ability to reproduce and redistribute, not just inspect, copies of government
records such as video footage).
216. See Marie-Alexis Valente, Transformativeness in the Age of Mass Digitization, 90 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 233, 238 (2016) (“[A] transformative purpose exists when a copyrighted work is
copied verbatim but is put to a new purpose. Physical changes are not necessary to find a
transformative purpose; where the work is put into a new context, given new insights, or serves a
different function than the original, courts may find in favor of transformativeness.”).
217. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (enumerating “the purpose and character of the use” as one of four
statutory considerations in determining whether a use is defensibly fair).
219. See Open Records Decision, Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. ORD-180, 4 (Oct. 20, 1977)
(recognizing conundrum that agency cannot determine whether requester’s use qualifies as fair
without inquiring how requester intends to use the documents—an inquiry forbidden by state FOI
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would balk at being required to commit to reusing a public record “fairly”
as a prerequisite for obtaining a copy of it.
News outlets increasingly use their vast online bandwidth to build
audience credibility by sharing their original source documents for public
inspection. For example, when the fabled football program at Penn State
University was rocked by a scandal over the coverup of a former assistant
coach’s serial child molestation, news organizations obtained and posted
the entire 267-page investigative report commissioned by the university,
enabling the public to see what led to the removal of a legendary head
coach and criminal charges against the university’s president.220 In a
more recent instance with echoes of Penn State, news organizations
republished the entire 150-page findings of a law firm’s investigation of
Title IX compliance at Louisiana State University (LSU), disclosing
significant failings in LSU’s response to complaints of sexual
harassment.221 As the Supreme Court’s cautionary Harper & Row case
counsels, even republishing a small percentage of an original work can
constitute an indefensible infringement if the republished excerpt is the
“most powerful” portion of the original.222 A hidebound government
agency could persuasively argue that republishing the entirety of a 150page-plus document is more than the amount necessary for a journalist to
effectively convey the story, thus exceeding the bounds of fair use.
News organizations need categorical assurance that documents like the
Penn State and LSU reports can be republished without fear of copyright
liability, not the fact-specific, case-by-case weighing that fair use
entails.223 They need that assurance before they publish—not after years
of judicial fact-finding—or else they will not publish at all.
Moreover, access under state FOI law is in no way limited to
law). See also News-Press Publ’g Co. v. Gadd, 388 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that agency faced with request for records under Florida law may not inquire into
requester’s motive for request).
220. See generally FREEH, SPORKIN & SULLIVAN LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY
RELATING TO THE CHILD ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/396512-report-final-071212.html
[https://perma.cc/2MQ3-2UPL]; see also Jeffrey Toobin, Former Penn State President Graham
Spanier Speaks, NEW YORKER (Aug. 21, 2012) (detailing timeline of case and criminal charges
against former Penn State president), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/former-pennstate-president-graham-spanier-speaks [https://perma.cc/F759-XQH4].
221. Read the Full Husch Blackwell Report on LSU’s Mishandling of Sexual Misconduct Cases,
THE (BATON ROUGE) ADVOC. (Mar. 5, 2021, 11:05 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/
baton_rouge/sports/lsu/article_0f178d48-7dd5-11eb-9ec9-3733426e4ee0.html
[https://perma.cc/7DP9-TDTB].
222. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985).
223. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that
fair-use defense “defies codification” and that line-drawing questions “cannot be answered
precisely”).
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journalists, nor is there authority to ration the production of copies. If one
reporter is entitled to make one copy with no intention of republishing
it—which seems well within the uses that copyright law would recognize
as “fair”—then 10,000 members of the public must equally be entitled to
make copies, should they all file public-records requests. Copyright law
plainly would not allow for such unfettered duplication and reuse of a
commercially valuable book, movie, or photograph. This is where
treating government records as copyright-protected property becomes
irreconcilable with notions of transparency and good governance.
C. Liberating the Public’s Information
In 2018, in response to public concerns about the unjustified use of
force by officers, California enacted reform legislation directing every
local police department to publish its “training, policies, practices, and
operating procedures” on a centralized website.224 But when a watchdog
organization, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), went looking for
records reflecting how California police are trained to use facial
recognition technology or automated license plate readers, the response
was that the training curriculum was unavailable, because the instructor
was asserting copyright protection.225 Months after its initial request for
access went unfulfilled, the EFF was forced to file suit under the
California Public Records Act to compel disclosure.226 There is no more
salient public issue in contemporary American life than the behavior of
police officers, and for copyright to obstruct the public’s ability to know
whether police are being correctly and adequately trained—in derogation
of the express intent of California’s legislature and governor—is a
flashing red signal that rigorous enforcement of copyright is incompatible
with public accountability.227
224. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13650 (2020); see also Jessie Gomez, Law Enforcement Agencies
in California Will Soon be Legally Obliged to Post Their Guidelines Online, MUCKROCK (Oct. 5,
2018),
https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2018/oct/05/ca-police-update-ii/
[https://perma.cc/KY6C-DU7T] (explaining that legislation would require posting training
materials online by January 2020).
225. Dave Maass & Naomi Gilens, California Agency Blocks Release of Police Use of Force
and
Surveillance
Training,
Claiming
Copyright,
EFF
(June
25,
2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/06/california-agency-blocks-release-police-use-force-andsurveillance-training [https://perma.cc/48GF-V99Y].
226. Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Sues Police Standards Agency to
Obtain Use of Force Training Materials (May 21, 2021), https://www.eff.org/press/releases/effsues-police-standards-agency-obtain-use-force-training-materials
[https://perma.cc/QUX7QXD7].
227. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police
Policymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891, 893 (2018) (describing how more than three thousand U.S.
law enforcement organizations contract with private vendors to supply policies and training
materials, with the consequence that public cannot access underlying work papers showing how
standards are formulated).
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The interaction between FOI law and copyright law should be clarified
by statute—ideally in a uniform nationwide way, to avoid the conundrum
that, as in the NCTQ syllabus cases, the very same document might be
deemed off-limits in one state on copyright grounds, yet accessible in
another. Clarification would also relieve government agencies from being
whipsawed between a requester who claims a violation of state FOI law
and a third-party rightsholder who claims a violation of federally
protected intellectual property rights.228
Categorically, the government’s own purported copyright interests in
government-created works should never override open-records law.
Otherwise, FOI law could be easily manipulated by asserting copyright
protection for every memo, report, or study that an agency prefers to keep
hidden.229 The fact that unpublished work receives heightened deference
in a copyright infringement analysis would undermine the foundational
purpose of investigative reporting if widely applied to government
documents and data. One need only recall that one of the most acclaimed
feats of investigative journalism of all time, the publication of a leaked
Defense Department history of U.S. strategic failings in Vietnam (the
“Pentagon Papers”), involved unpublished work that the agency had no
intention of ever sharing with the public.230
If government agencies were permitted to paywall their most valuable
documents and data behind copyright law, records could be made
inaccessible as a practical matter by way of extractive fees. Cost can
already be a prohibitive barrier to the accessibility of government records
even under existing FOI laws, which are supposed to limit what an
agency can charge for search, retrieval, and duplication.231 If the
228. On this point, the case of Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 631 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
is instructive. In Weisberg, the D.C. Circuit held that the rightsholder to photographs held by a
federal agency should be joined as a necessary party in a FOIA dispute over the photos, to avoid
subjecting the agency to inconsistent obligations if the photos were produced and the rightsholder
then sued for infringement. Id. at 831.
229. Petersen has even suggested that there may be First Amendment implications if a
government agency, under no compulsion to do so, discretionarily chooses to make its records
inaccessible by way of copyright protection in a way that frustrates citizens’ ability to speak on
political issues and petition the government for redress of grievances. See Petersen, supra note 5,
at 464 (“[T]he potential for conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment increases
significantly when government seeks to protect its own work through copyright.”).
230. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (declining on First
Amendment grounds to sanction government’s attempt to restrain publication of leaked national
security documents); see also Peter Kihss, The Times Wins a Pulitzer For the Pentagon Papers,
N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1972, at A1 (reporting that the Times’ publication of previously unpublished
Defense Department study was recognized with the Pulitzer Prize for meritorious public service).
231. See John Bender, Solid Gold Photocopies: A Review of Fees for Copies of Public Records
Established Under State Open Records Laws, 29 URB. LAW. 81, 88 (1997) (“Different jurisdictions
and different agencies have wildly varying ideas of what constitutes a reasonable fee or what may
contribute to the direct cost of copying a public record.”).

204

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 53

government is free to set a “market rate” for its documents and data—and
there is no “market,” because the government is the only supplier—
licensing fees could become a backdoor means of denying access.
Copyright law has always recognized that works created by federal
employees in the course of their employment are public property that may
be freely used, adapted, and shared. There is no indication after two and
one-half centuries of experience that federal agencies are less creative or
innovative than state, county, or city agencies because the latter can assert
copyright ownership of employees’ work. None of the core objectives of
copyright law is advanced by extending it to cover works produced in the
ordinary course of government business. A state auditor needs no
“creativity protection” as an incentive to produce an audit.232
A government agency is under no compulsion to assert copyright when
faced with a demand to produce public records. The agency is, in effect,
manufacturing the impediment if it insists on withholding a governmentproduced document on copyright grounds. In the analogous context of
contractual settlement agreements, courts have overwhelmingly held that
an agency cannot enter into an agreement to contract away the public’s
right to see the outcome of a lawsuit, especially one where public money
changes hands.233 By the same logic, a government agency cannot rely
on its discretionary choice to insist on copyright protection to excuse
compliance with a legally valid FOI request.
States are fully capable of crafting workarounds for narrow subsets of
government-created material, such as software, that can be legitimately
protected by copyright without doing violence to the public’s entitlement
to essential civic information. Florida law provides an instructive
roadmap: copyright is not an impediment to the public’s right of access,
because agencies are not allowed to secure copyright protection for their
232. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using
Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (“The law grants
protection for copyrighted works in order to achieve a goal—the advancement of knowledge and
learning. It is believed that without the marketable right of the copyright there would be insufficient
incentives for the creation and distribution of creative works.”). See also Bender, supra note 231,
at 120 (“No county, for instance, is likely to stop keeping real estate assessment records simply
because no one buys copies of them. Governments collect this information for public purposes,
which are already fully paid for through taxes.”).
233. See, e.g., Bradley v. Ackal, 954 F.3d 216, 233 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that press and public
had a right of access to settlement agreement in a lawsuit brought by survivors of a detainee who
died in back of a police car, even though court sealed settlement terms by parties’ mutual
agreement); Trib.-Rev. Publ’g Co. v. Westmoreland Cnty. Hous. Auth., 833 A.2d 112, 116 (Pa.
2003) (“[A] settlement document involving a public body that has acted within its official capacity
contains information relating to the conduct of the public’s business [and is subject to disclosure
notwithstanding a negotiated confidentiality agreement].”); State ex rel. Findlay Publ’g Co. v.
Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 684 N.E.2d 1222, 1224 (Ohio 1997) (“In general, a settlement
agreement of a lawsuit in which a public office is a party is a public record subject to
disclosure . . . .”).
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records unless expressly authorized by statute.234
But the public’s need for records from government agencies does not
stop with those created by public employees. As in the Utah jails case,
the public needs records obtained by government from the private sector
when those records are central to the policymaking process—or when
those records become government policy. And as in Washington’s
Lindberg case, the public needs access to records created by regulated
entities for purposes of commenting effectively on how those regulations
are being applied and enforced.235 Lacking the ability to copy and
redistribute private entities’ records in the custody of government
agencies, news coverage and citizen activism would be hampered.
Imagine, for instance, an environmental group trying to generate
grassroots opposition to a massive development project by telling each of
its members to travel to City Hall to ask to see drawings of the
development. Allowing rightsholders to dictate how public records are
shared by asserting (or waiving) their copyright interests selectively
raises the real risk of enlisting the government custodian in acts of
forbidden viewpoint discrimination—for instance, if the developer in the
Lindberg case insisted that critics of the planned housing development
could not make copies of its drawings on file with the county, but that
supporters of the project could freely do so.236
While the equities may be different for material created by third parties
and maintained in government custody,237 narrower and less informationrestrictive alternatives to copyright exist. Trade secret exemptions to FOI
law adequately address the competitive needs of private industry without
the need to recognize a new and different “copyright exemption.”238
When a document is recognized as containing protected trade secrets, it
234. See Recs., License Agreements for Cnty. Maps, Op. Fla. Att’y Gen. No. 2003-42 (Sept. 3,
2003) (opining that GIS maps and data compiled by county government were subject to production
as public records, because no statute expressly authorized county to obtain copyright protection);
see also Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Southpointe Pharm., 636 So. 2d 1377, 1383 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting copyright argument as to transcript of administrative hearing
maintained on file with state agency and ordering production under Florida Open Records Act).
235. Lindberg v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 948 P.2d 805, 814 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
236. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.”).
237. See Leslie A. Street & David R. Hansen, Who Owns the Law? Why We Must Restore Public
Ownership of Legal Publishing, 26 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 233 (2019) (recognizing unique
copyright concerns when government agencies merely use works belonging to others, as opposed
to hiring private contractors to create work especially for government use).
238. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion, N.Y. Comm. on Open Gov’t No. F11109 (Oct. 19, 1998), an
advisory opinion stating that a copyright analysis need not be applied to a requester’s demand for
access to medical protocols obtained by the City of Buffalo from a private vendor, because the
state’s FOI exemption for commercially valuable trade secrets would fully address the vendor’s
concerns.
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is treated as exempt from government disclosure indefinitely, with no
need for any registration formalities or renewals.239 But unlike copyright,
trade-secret protection requires a showing both that the information is not
widely shared and that disclosure would be economically harmful.240
Thus, the set of protected works is narrowed to works of provable
commercial value. For example, when a requester sought to use the Ohio
Public Records Act to obtain copies of standardized tests administered to
ninth-graders, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded it was unnecessary to
decide whether copyright applied to the exams, because the documents
could be withheld under Ohio’s statutory exemption for trade secrets.241
Requiring that a third party take affirmative steps to protect filings made
with government agencies as trade-secret documents ameliorates the
concern that government agencies might disingenuously invoke the
copyright interests of third parties for purposes of concealment, even
where the third parties may be indifferent to disclosure and have no
intention of pursuing legal remedies if disclosure is made.242 At least one
federal court has already recognized this danger and rejected an agency’s
position that the copyright interests of private rightsholders should
foreclose producing their documents when the documents are being held
and used by federal agencies: “[I]nterpreting FOIA as the Government
urges would allow an agency to mask its processes or functions from
public scrutiny simply by asserting a third party’s copyright.”243
Whether the document was created by the government or merely
obtained by the government from an outside third party, the proper time
to debate the copyright status of the work is not when a requester asks to
239. See Samuels, supra note 8, at 469 (“[Trade secret protection] is potentially unlimited in
terms, and does not require public disclosure or governmental registration or examination of the
information that is protected . . . . [As such, it] is preferable to, and can be more effective and
efficient than, patent or copyright protection.”).
240. See id. at 470 (describing prevailing test for trade secret designation under open records
law, derived from Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which requires showing that information derives
economic value from not being generally known or ascertainable by competitors, and that its holder
has taken reasonable measures to secure its confidentiality).
241. State ex rel Perrea v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., 916 N.E.2d 1049, 1054–55 (Ohio 2009).
242. The Pennsylvania court’s ruling in Ali v. Phila. City Plan. Comm’n, 125 A.3d 92 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) opens the door to exactly such manipulation of copyright law as an artifice to
evade disclosure. There, the court held that “where a local agency invokes the Copyright Act as a
basis to limit access to a public record to inspection only, the absence of consent by the copyright
owner to duplication . . . should be presumed.” Id. at 105 (emphasis added). If Ali were to become
the common understanding of how copyright law interacts with FOI law, then the normal
presumptions in favor of disclosure would be inverted. It would become the burden of the records
requester to prove that duplicating a public record does not harm the interests of the (absent)
rightsholder—a burden that could be carried only by asking a state court to pass on the application
of the fair-use doctrine, a fraught proposition.
243. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 631 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (internal quotations
omitted).
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inspect or copy it, but when it is redistributed.244 At that point, if the
rightsholder believes the redistribution exceeds the bounds of a
defensible fair use, then a garden-variety infringement suit can be brought
in federal court, where judges are well-equipped to calibrate fair-use
judgments. This is a much narrower remedy than denying everyone the
opportunity to review or duplicate a record based on the concern that a
subset of users might monetize it without compensating the rightsholder.
Government data should be understood as a public good no less than a
street or a park, and if data becomes available only to elites who can pay
licensing fees, we risk creating a society of “information haves” and
“information have-nots”—exactly the concern that animated the Supreme
Court to rule in favor of the publisher in Public.Resource.org.245
The case of County of Suffolk v. First American Real Estate Solutions
is instructive as a roadmap.246 There, a county government brought a
copyright infringement suit against a company accused of improperly
profiteering from reselling county-produced real estate maps.247 The
defendant argued that New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
precluded the county from securing and enforcing a copyright to frustrate
the disclosure imperatives of FOIL.248 The Second Circuit declined to
interpret FOIL as a blanket abrogation of a local government’s ability to
protect its copyright ownership rights:
[T]he extent of the state agency’s obligation is to make its records
available for public inspection and copying. It is one thing to read this
provision to permit a member of the public to copy a public record, but
it is quite another to read into it the right of a private entity to distribute
commercially what it would otherwise, under copyright law, be unable
to distribute.249

Thus, the court recognized that an agency could not invoke copyright
to prevent a requester from reviewing and copying records—or even to
prevent a journalist from making a fair use of records obtained by way of

244. See Virginia Freedom of Information Act: Topographic Maps Required to Be Open to
Inspection and Copying, Op. Va. Att’y. Gen. No. 443, 1982 WL 175878, at *1 (Mar. 25, 1982)
(opining that Virginia FOI law gives requesters the ability to inspect and copy topographic maps
made by a county property tax office, but that copyright remedies might apply if the maps were
subsequently reproduced without the county’s consent).
245. See Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1498, 1512 (2020) (describing a
hypothetical scenario in which readers with access only to the “economy-class” version of the
Georgia statutes might be misinformed about their rights, while purchasers who could afford the
“first-class” version would know which statutes are and are not judicially enforced).
246. Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Est. Sols., 261 F. 3d 179 (2d Cir. 2001).
247. Id. at 183.
248. Id. at 188.
249. Id. at 189.
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FOIL250—but that an infringement action could lie against a user who
commercially exploited the records beyond the boundaries of fair use.
Returning to the Utah jail scenario, if a competing organization
attempted to sell a knockoff version of the copyright-protected Utah Jail
Standards after seeing the standards on a news blog, then the rightsholder
would have recourse against the competitor. This is the scenario in the
Ninth Circuit’s Practice Management case; the issue was not whether a
citizen could inspect and copy privately developed standards for purposes
of political or civic participation, but whether a for-profit publisher could
republish and sell privately developed standards in ways arguably
competing with their creator.251
The answer to reconciling nongovernmental copyright interests with
FOI law is in plain sight. Because the Supreme Court recognizes that fair
use is a necessary accommodation to make copyright law constitutional
in accordance with the First Amendment,252 copyright law cannot be
applied in a way that forecloses attempting a fair use.253 The ability to
make a fair use of a record for a statutory purpose such as critique or
commentary—or to use the facts and ideas in the record, as opposed to
its protected expressive qualities254—is what makes it constitutional for
copyright to act as a prior restraint on infringement.255 If a requester
would otherwise have a statutorily guaranteed right to inspect and copy a
record, copyright cannot constitutionally defeat that right. This is
especially so because it is the agency, not the requester, that is making
the copy, so there is no infringing “wrong” to hold the requester
250. See id. (“First American ignores the fact that the free press or an individual seeking to use
the state agency records to educate others or to criticize the state or the state agency may be
protected by the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine.”).
251. Prac. Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 121 F.3d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1997).
252. See sources cited supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
253. See Lehmann, supra note 215, at 27 (“If the materials had already been ‘published’—that
is, were already available publicly in a tangible form—there would likely be no dispute because
the filmmaker would be able to use the materials in his documentary so long as their use is
considered fair use. . . . Put another way, the practical effect of the University’s copyright
preemption argument is to effectively curtail the filmmaker’s First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.”).
254. The court in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987), relies on this
ideas/expression dichotomy, noting at several points that, while the biographer/defendant may not
republish large portions of Salinger’s letters, he is free to draw on their ideas. See id. at 96 (“The
biographer who copies only facts incurs no risk of an injunction; he has not taken copyrighted
material.”).
255. The court in New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), recognized this tension in refusing to enjoin even an infringing use of material by a
biographer writing about a newsworthy public figure: “[T]o make [copyright] inevitably prevail
over all competing considerations would lead to absurd results that are almost incompatible with
First Amendment interests. By registering a copyright, public figures who are the expected focus
of public interest could use this supposed commercial protection as an aggressive weapon to prevent
the publication of embarrassing revelations and to obstruct criticism.” Id. at 1502.
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responsible for.256 This clean solution avoids the intractable problem of
putting inexpert employees of city, county and state agencies into the
business of determining whether records—which can attain copyright
protection without registration or other formalities257—do or do not
qualify for a copyright exemption to FOI law.258 This understanding also
spares agencies from a landmine of liability for the judgments of
nonlawyer clerks and secretaries who, many thousands of times a day,
furnish copies of documents that might theoretically qualify for copyright
protection if the creator insisted on enforcing it.
To critics who would argue that, without copyright protection, private
industry will hesitate to do business with government, the response is
threefold. First, open-government laws are purposefully strong medicine,
and they do not yield to convenience. All manner of records that might
be embarrassing or unflattering (such as arrest records) are subject to
mandatory disclosure, even if those mentioned in them would prefer
otherwise, because the public’s interest in oversight of governance is so
overriding.
Second, the risk that proprietary records might become publicly
accessible and thus suffer diminished value is a risk that can be priced
into an arrangement with government clientele. The risk that doing
business with one client will result in losing a prospective sale to another
client is routinely baked into the price of goods and services. For instance,
the architects who agree to build a signature home in a luxury subdivision
know that the same design they have just used for 123 Walnut Drive
cannot be resold to the neighbor at 125 Walnut Drive, and they price their
services accordingly. It is perhaps unfortunate that a government agency
256. For this reason, the workaround once suggested by the Texas and Nevada attorneys
general—that requesters make their own copies and assume the risk of copyright liability for doing
so (see supra note 118 and accompanying text)—is something of a “coward’s way out” of the
dilemma. The agency has a statutory duty to furnish copies. The agency cannot discretionarily
choose to ignore its statutory duty unless federal law forbids doing so, and copyright law does not—
or at least does not always clearly do so, since many courts have found the provision of a duplicate
to constitute a fair use.
257. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A
Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 333 (2010) (explaining that 1976 revisions
to Copyright Act made fixation in tangible form, rather than publication with notice, the starting
point for copyright protection).
258. For example, a purely “factual” document that a third party files with the government, such
as a blank form or a table of numbers, might not contain the requisite originality and creativity to
qualify for copyright protection. See, e.g., CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97
F.3d 1504, 1520 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that advertising brochure with short, standard phrases
lacked sufficient creativity to qualify for copyright protection). But that is not a determination that
a clerk in a county property tax office is normally equipped to make. As noted FOI authority
Barbara A. Petersen has observed, even the existence of a registration with the U.S. Copyright
Office does not resolve whether a document is in fact copyright protected, as that is ultimately a
judgment for the courts. See Petersen, supra note 5, at 448.
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might pay a premium price to compensate a standard-setting body for the
market risk of future lost sales, but we require government agencies to
absorb all manner of costs—publishing public notice of rulemakings,
conducting public hearings for ordinances, and so on—as the accepted
price of an informed, participatory citizenry.259
Third and finally, the rightsholder retains the full benefit of Copyright
Act remedies against the ultimate end user of a government document if
that document is exploited beyond the bounds of a defensible fair use.260
Here, one might analogize productively to the example of public libraries.
Each public library contains thousands of volumes of copyright-protected
material that is freely available for public inspection—and almost every
one of them also contains a self-service copy machine. A public-policy
decision has been universally made to offer copying services, even
knowing that some subset of users might decide to redistribute what they
copy in infringing ways (e.g., duplicating an entire edition of a magazine
and uploading it to the web in a way that undermines sales), because there
are societally beneficial purposes in enabling people to make copies for
research—and because there are effective legal remedies against the
infringing outlaw user (and not, it must be emphasized, the library). An
agency’s repository of public records is the community’s “civic library.”
It is the storehouse of knowledge that copyright cannot padlock, if the
public and press are to effectively discharge their civic oversight roles.261

259. See Tones, supra note 140, at 393 (“[I]t is the government who is in the better position to
pay this price for essentially ‘outsourcing’ their legislative work.”). Tones also suggests that
uncertainty over the status of standards prepared by private third parties could be clarified simply
by contractually designating any standards supplied to government agencies as “works made for
hire.” Id. at 392. This, she acknowledges, might result in states having to pay more for a service
they have obtained for little to no cost, but added expense does not make the solution unworthy of
consideration. See also Street & Hansen, supra note 237, at 243 (“Governments that seek to
simplify their work by ‘adopting’ or ‘incorporating by reference’ standards produced by private
organizations should compensate the private organizations for their work, and then make any
adopted legal standard freely available to the public.”).
260. As far back as 1989, before the widespread digitization of documents, Professor John A.
Kidwell recognized the growing tension between FOI and copyright law and proposed such an
accommodation: “Just as open records statutes should not forfeit copyright, neither should the fact
that a work is copyrighted be allowed to defeat the right to access [] the work if it has become a
public record.” John A. Kidwell, Open Records Laws and Copyright, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1021,
1028.
261. See Regalia, supra note 37, at 90 (“The public’s right to information is a cornerstone of
any democratic legal system[]. Indeed, a democratic government operating in secrecy is no
democracy at all.”); see also Netanel, supra note 45, at 352 (“A regime in which government
administrators exert broad control over the content and dissemination of tangible expression will
be unlikely to maintain viable civil institutions.”).

